THE OCTOBER 22, 2014, OTTAWA SHOOTINGS:

WHY CANADIANS NEED A PUBLIC INQUIRY

Graeme MacQueen
October 3, 2015
A Report for Democracy Probe International

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PREFACE / 4
SUMMARY / 5
INTRODUCTION: HAVE THE OCTOBER 22, 2014, OTTAWA SHOOTINGS
BEEN SATISFACTORILY INVESTIGATED? / 7
Police Reports / 8
Media / 10
MICHAEL ZEHAF-BIBEAU: HIS CAPACITY AND INTENTIONS / 12
Identity of the Perpetrator / 12
The Iconic Photograph / 14
Zehaf-Bibeaus Capacity / 15
Zehaf-Bibeaus Tools / 15
Zehaf-Bibeaus Possible Accomplices / 19
Zehaf-Bibeaus Intentions / 24
The Video Message / 24
Zehaf-Bibeaus Shots / 26
CANADIAN SECURITY SERVICES: WHAT WARNINGS DID THEY RECEIVE
AND WERE THEY JUSTIFIED IN KILLING ZEHAF-BIBEAU? / 32
Terrorism Warnings / 32
The Killing of Zehaf-Bibeau / 37
Political Framing of the Investigation / 37
Was the Killing of Zehaf-Bibeau Justified? / 38
WAS ZEHAF-BIBEAU A TERRORISTIF SO, WHAT KIND? / 42
Types of Terrorism Currently Common in North America / 42
Was Zehaf-Bibeau a Managed Terrorist? / 46
DOES CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY ENCOURAGE DOMESTIC
TERRORISM? / 50

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: THE NEED FOR A PUBLIC

INQUIRY / 52
Questions / 52
Basic Facts / 53
Recommendations / 54
APPENDIX A: THE POLICE REPORTS / 56
APPENDIX B: THE ICONIC PHOTOGRAPH / 59
APPENDIX C: TRANSCRIPT OF ZEHAF-BIBEAU VIDEO / 67
APPENDIX D: ANALYSIS OF ZEHAF-BIBEAU VIDEO / 68
APPENDIX E: PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE TERRORISM WARNING / 70
APPENDIX F: WAS ZEHAF-BIBEAU WEARING BODY ARMOUR? / 71
BIBLIOGRAPHY

PREFACE
When the October 22, 2014, Ottawa shootings took place I had just completed a
book on the 2001 anthrax attacks in the United States. I had become aware that
in the War on Terror things are not always what they seem. Listening to the
evolving explanations of the RCMP, I was unsatisfied. Moreover, as
Commissioner Paulson asked Canadian citizens to be patient with his
investigation, the Conservative government showed no patience at all. It rapidly
passed a series of bills that reduced the civil rights of the population while giving
increased powers to security services.
Seeing Parliament intimidated by the shootings, watching the Conservative
government take advantage of the situation, noting that there were no plans for a
public inquiry into these violent incidents, I decided to look into the matter myself.
This report sets forth, as succinctly as possible, the main questions to which we
need answers. It is not the public inquiry we need, but it makes the case for such
an inquiry.
I wish to thank all those whose work encouraged me to carry out this study: John
McMurtry, Anthony Hall, Amy MacPherson, Tony Cartalucci, Barrie Zwicker,
Peter Dale Scott and Dario Di Meo. Barrie Zwicker and Dario Di Meo were
exceptionally generous in opening their own files to me and taking the time to
offer advice, criticism and encouragement. I thank also Herb Jenkins, Gary Purdy
and Mark Vorobej for reading and commenting on early drafts of this work.
I have been greatly stimulated by debates and discussions with fellow members
of Democracy Probe International, a young nongovernmental organization based
in Hamilton, Ontario dedicated to the strengthening of democratic governance. I
felt honoured when I was asked to submit my study of the October 22, 2014,
events to DPI.
None of the above parties is responsible for my findings, speculations or
conclusions.

THE OCTOBER 22, 2014, OTTAWA SHOOTINGS:

WHY CANADIANS NEED A PUBLIC INQUIRY
SUMMARY
This 25,000 word report calls for a federal public inquiry into the Ottawa
shootings of October 22, 2014.
The October 22 events were used by the Canadian government to justify the
passage of several billsC-51 is the most famousthat reduce the civil rights of
Canadians while expanding the powers of security services. Yet there has been
no serious investigation into the events of that day.
Security services killed the suspect so there will be no court case.
Police reports released in March, 2015 steer clear of the central questions and
are marred by poor methodology and unjustified conclusions.
Journalists have declined to probe questions that beg for answers.
The report makes the case for an inquiry by setting out the important questions
as clearly as possible. Among the questions explored are thirty-four listed in the
reports Conclusion. Examples (with some editing) are:

How did Zehaf-Bibeau acquire his rifle, bullets, and knife?

Did Zehaf-Bibeau have help on October 22 or in the stages of preparation
and planning?
Is there evidence that Zehaf-Bibeau intended to kill and terrorize civilians?
How precise were the advance warnings received by security services as
to the nature, locations, and timing of the attacks?
Why did the RCMP lie to the Canadian public about the advance
warnings?
Would the soldiers killed on October 20th (in Quebec) and 22nd (in
Ottawa) still be alive if the serious nature of the advance warnings had
been explained to them?
Why, if the BC provincial politicians and legislative security staff were well
briefed by the Canadian intelligence community, did police in Ottawa,
including the RCMP, get taken by surprise?
Why do none of the four police reports released to the public, at least in
the redacted forms available to us, mention the Integrated Terrorism
Assessment Centre and Privy Council Office warnings?
Was the police killing of Zehaf-Bibeau necessary?
Were security or intelligence forces, Canadian or foreign, complicit in any
way or to any degree in the October 22 attacks by Zehaf-Bibeau?
Why has the Canadian government dealt with poor security on Parliament
5

Hill by reducing the civil rights of all Canadian citizens?

Until these questions are answered doubts will remain about the political
initiatives that have exploited these events.

INTRODUCTION
HAVE THE OCTOBER 22, 2014, OTTAWA SHOOTINGS BEEN
SATISFACTORILY INVESTIGATED?
On October 22, 2014, an armed man, having killed a soldier at the War
Memorial, ran into Centre Block on Parliament Hill in Canadas capital. His
incursion has been called the most serious security breach on Parliament Hill in
history.1 Canadas Prime Minister Stephen Harper at once began to use the
days events to justify new legislation strengthening intelligence and police
powers at the expense of the civil liberties of Canadians and to support acts of
war in the Middle East.2 The days events were cited by Harper as an example of
the terrorist threat Canada faces.3

The use of the October 22, 2014, victims name: Patrol Base Cirillo in Iraq
Credit: Reuters

Bill C-51, now made law in Canada, was one of three bills expanding intelligence
powers (the other two are C-13 and C-44) that had their passages eased by the
October 22 events or by the related attack on two soldiers on October 20 in
Quebec.
Every Canadian citizen has lost civil rights because of the October 22 event.
Every Canadian citizen has a reason to insist on knowing what happened on that
day and why it happened.
The October 22 suspect, Michael Zehaf-Bibeau, was killed by policeas was the
suspect in the Quebec incident two days earlierand there will be no trial. A

public trial involves gathering information, presenting evidence, and ascertaining

truth. With a public trial Canadian citizens would have heard the arguments of the
state and seen its evidence. There would have been the presentation of
competing accounts of events by lawyers for the prosecution and the defence.
There would have been cross-examination of witnesses. The suspect would have
been tried before a jury of his peers, which would have considered, debated,
deliberated, and made its decision.
Since security forces killed the suspect how will citizens ever know what
happened? Unless a public inquiry is held, civil society will be held captive of the
account of events given by police and by government institutions supportive of
the police narrative. Citizens may informally grab what scraps of information they
can (by talking to eyewitnesses, taking photos and videos on cellphones,
collecting media reports, and so on), but police will decide what evidence can be
seen and what cannot be seen.
As it happens, neither the police nor the media have given us anything remotely
adequate as a substitute for a legal process or formal inquiry.
Police Reports
On June 3, 2015, four police reports related to the October 22 incident were
released to the public. (See Appendix A.) Canadian citizens finally had the
opportunity to hear the arguments and see the evidence to which they would be
permitted access.
The reports contain reasonable recommendations for improving security on
Parliament Hill. More precisely, the House of Commons Incident Response
Summarys recommendations are reasonable, as are the recommendations in
the Ontario Provincial Polices RCMP Security Posture. It is impossible to
comment on the RCMPs recommendations in External Engagement and
Coordination since they were removed before the document was released to the
public.
But the reports have serious defects.
First, there is the issue of unjustified conclusions. For example, the OPPs RCMP
Security Posture states, The unfortunate incidents of October 22, 2014, at the
Cenotaph and Parliament Hill are a grim reminder that Canada is ill-prepared to
prevent and respond to such attacks (p. 29). This conclusion is completely
unsupported by evidence. That certain aspects of security preparations in Ottawa
were inadequate on October 22 is clear enough, but this does not mean
Canada was unprepared, in a way that would justify new national legislation or,
in fact, national initiatives of any kind.

Second, there is the matter of poor methodology. Since Canadians will not
benefit from the evidence and argument a trial would have provided, they
deserve investigations with serious safeguards and standards. Otherwise, why
take these reports seriously?
Consider the most weighty of the four released police reports, the Independent
Investigation.
The report relies mainly on eyewitness evidence. It discusses physical evidence
briefly but there is little effort spent reconciling the two forms of evidence or
incorporating them into a connected account.
Eyewitness evidence is a valid and important form of evidence, but there are
many precautions that have to be taken in gathering it and further precautions to
be taken in presenting it to make a case. The report shows no sign of such
precautions:

The names of all eyewitnesses are deleted.

We are not told if the eyewitnesses gave their testimony under oath.
The eyewitness accounts are paraphrased, not quoted.
No information is given as to when, where, or by whom the eyewitnesses
were interviewed.
The interview questions are not given nor are the responses, so we do not
know what has been deleted or edited.
There is little attempt to reconcile contradictory eyewitness accounts or to
create a full and detailed account.
Due to the replacement of all names with indistinguishable rows of
asterisks (distinctive letters, numbers or pseudonyms could have been
used instead), some of the accounts are simply indecipherable and we
cannot tell who did what.

As for the physical evidence, there is surprisingly little attention given to it.
Original documents are not given and findings related to gunshots and wounds
are paraphrased by anonymous persons. We cannot tell if anything has been
omitted or changed. When it is inconvenient for the narrative being told, this
evidence is largely ignored.
Furthermore, important facts of the case are relayed with no explanation, even
when they may strike members of the public as odd. For example, although we
are told Zehaf-Bibeau was dead by about 9:56 a.m. (p. 27), at which time he was
found to have no pulse, he was not officially pronounced dead until 11:30 p.m. (p.
33). Why such a wait? No explanation is given.
Later in the present report the matter of shots fired will be examined. The case
will serve as a concrete example of the flaws in these police reports.

But of all the deficiencies of the police reports, the central one is that they do not
answerthey seldom even addressthe truly critical questions about the
October 22 event. These unanswered questions will be described in the present
report. For convenience, thirty-four of them are listed in the Conclusions.
Media
Can the media take on the investigative job on behalf of civil society, ferreting out
the facts and presenting them in the absence of a formal procedure? To some
extent, they can. The present report is based largely on media coverage. These
sources have been invaluable. On the other hand, the media certainly have not
performed functions we would expect of a trial or inquiry.
Proneness to mistakes, especially during times of tension, is the medias most
obvious weakness. With great confidence CBCs Evan Solomon showed viewers
on October 23, 2014, nine precise bullet holes in the wall of Centre Block near
the Parliamentary library that, he said, were created by shots fired at Michael
Zehaf-Bibeau by security officers.4 Unfortunately, a citizen researcher was able
to demonstrate promptly that not a single one of those holes had been created
on October 22.5
Then there is the manipulation of viewers, listeners, and readers through poorly
gathered evidence and dramatized presentation. On October 22, Rosemary
Barton and Evan Solomon discussed at some length a video that appeared to
show Zehaf-Bibeau getting into his car after the shooting at the War Memorial.6
As far as I can tell, this is genuine video footage of the perpetrator, but the way it
was presented was irresponsible. Solomon told us three times that the video was
chilling since it appeared to show Zehaf-Bibeau pausing slightly before getting
into his car with his rifle, thereby demonstrating his cold-bloodedness in the wake
of his killing. Try as I may, I can see no pause except when Solomons engineer
pauses the video. I can imagine a rifle though I cannot say with confidence that I
see it. And I find nothing chilling about these blurry images of a man getting into
a car.
What about provenance and chain of custody? In other words, where did this
video footage come from and who handled it before it was shown on CBC
Television? Barton told us the video had been sent to us
anonymously...um...ah...someone that doesnt want to be identified. Solomon
added that this is breaking news video sent anonymously...ah...here...Catherine
Cullen, our, our, our...um...colleague here at CBC obtained this for us. What this
means is that this piece of evidence, with mysterious provenance and incomplete
chain of custody, would never have been allowed into a courtroom. Yet large
numbers of Canadians saw it on television at the height of the stress and
emotion of October 22 and were told how to feel about these images and what
their significance was.

10

A further failing of Canadian media has been the dearth of genuine investigative
journalism. Why were so many crucial images (the car video just mentioned, for
example) left uninvestigated? Why did no one follow through with a thorough
investigation of threats and warnings received by government and security
services in advance of the attack? Why the casual acceptance of police
statements that were unaccompanied by evidence or even, in some cases,
clearly false? And why the reluctance to mention the possibility of police
complicity in the attack?
Some will feel that I am going beyond the pale when I ask whether the RCMP
were complicit in the October attacks. But no responsible investigator can avoid
this possibility. As explained later in this report, federal police in both Canada and
the United States have a record of entrapping unstable or marginalized
individuals in jihadi projects.
In a CBC Radio interview on March 7, 2015, RCMP Commissioner Bob Paulson
stated that when he watched Zehaf-Bibeaus jihad video, apparently filmed in his
car directly before the October 22 attack (see Appendices C and D), he found it
shocking. Well, perhaps Mr. Paulson was shocked. But we must remember that
in the previous year the RCMP entrapped a similar bearded young man adrift in
Vancouvercaught, like Zehaf-Bibeau, between drug addiction and his personal
version of Islamand prompted him and his common law wife to make videos
taking responsibility for violence in the name of Allah7 (my italics). The RCMP
moles actively assisted in the jihadi video productions and even provided the
black Islamic flag the two used as a backdrop for a video message urging jihad
that they hoped would be released on the Internet if they died or were captured.8
If we ask whether similar dynamics were involved in the October 22 operation we
are by no means moving beyond acceptable discourse: We are being serious
investigators. In failing to ask such questions, Canadian mainstream media have
failed to do their job.
Clearly, the October 22 shootings have been satisfactorily investigated neither by
the police nor the media in Canada. The present report does not claim to fulfill
this need. It is a preliminary study that makes the case for an in-depth inquiry that
Canadians need and deserve.

11

MICHAEL ZEHAF-BIBEAU: HIS CAPACITY AND INTENTIONS

Identity of the Perpetrator
In the mid-afternoon of October 22 Canadian news sources apparently still did
not know the perpetrators name. Shortly before 4 p.m. CBC noted that police
would not give any information about the perpetrator, including his name.9 At
4:30 p.m. CBC Radio said that a US news station had just identified the suspect
as Michael Zehaf-Bibeau,10 and this was confirmed by the CBC at 5:00 p.m.11
The strangeness of this affair intensifies when we ask when, in fact, US sources
first identified the suspect.
On October 23, 2014, Canadian investigative journalist Amy MacPherson wrote
an article in which she gave evidence that Zehaf-Bibeaus name had been
released by US media by 10:54 a.m. on October 22.12 She reproduced a screengrab that suggested American news network CBS News had made this
identification, after which it had removed the identification from its website. Her
article included an image of the screen-grab, which said, The gunmen [sic] has
been identified by US officials as Michael Zehaf-Bibeau, a Canadian national
born in 1982.13
In removing this identification from its site, CBS was presumably showing
awareness of how awkward it was for this revelation to emerge in the United
States while the Canadian public, as well as Canadian Parliamentarians locked
down in Centre Block, were still in the dark about the perpetrators identity. Later
on October 22, US media said that the US sources from which they got the name
received their information from Canadian authorities.14 Presumably, at some
point in the hour after Zehaf-Bibeaus death the FBI decided to share this
information with CBS News.
Did the FBI make a beginners mistake in violating protocol through its early
release of the name or did the agency have a goal in mind? If it had a goal, what
was that goal?
While Michael Zehaf-Bibeau was rapidly identified as the person who carried out
both the attack at the War Memorial and the attack on Parliament, it took a while
for the media to settle on the form of his name, where various forms emerged in
early media accounts:
Michael Zehaf-Beaudou15
Michael Joseph Hall16
Michael Abdul Zehalf Bibeau17
Abdul Zehaf Bibeau18
Michael Joseph Paul Zehaf Bibeau19

12

Joseph Paul Michael Bibeau20

Joseph Paul Michael Abdallah Bulgasen Zehaf-Bibeau21
Biographical accounts of Zehaf-Bibeau, both short and long, were quickly offered
by the media.22 We were told that he had been raised in a good home and had
been given plenty of opportunities but had quickly gotten involved in drugs and
petty crime. Yet he adopted Islam as his religion and was critical of what he saw
as corrupt and materialistic Western civilization. He was critical as well of
Western foreign policy, and especially of the killing of Iraqis. He struggled
between piety and drug addiction and is reported to have said that he felt the
devil was after him.
These basic assertions have been confirmed by his mother.23 Additional claims
should be approached with caution. Had the case come to trial the witnesses
would be identified fully and cross-examined, whereas media accounts offered
an undifferentiated mixture of hearsay, cherry-picked evidence, and reports on
interviews with people of whose identity we are uncertain. We have no idea if
some of the people whose words about Zehaf-Bibeau have been quoted are
police informants or intelligence assets. For that matter, we do not know if ZehafBibeau himself may have had a special relationship at some point with police or
intelligence services.
One of the longest of the early biographical efforts (in Macleans Magazine) tells
us that Zehaf-Bibeau fell off the map for three years.24 What was he doing
during that time?
A troubling aspect of many media accounts is the tendency to distort facts
retrospectively to support the image of Zehaf-Bibeau as a dangerous jihadi. The
claim that he was a recent convert to Islam was common,25 especially in US
media, and the implication seemed to be that this was inherently worrisome. (The
good Michael Joseph Hall turns suddenly into the anxiety-producing Abdul.) In
the case of the crudest Internet sites, the aims of those shaping the narrative are
clear enough (Remove all practicing and religious Muslims from the
West...Deport them...),26 but even mainstream sources were full of coarse and
inaccurate statements.
According to Canadian news sources, apparently basing themselves on court
records, Zehaf-Bibeau became a Muslim ten years prior to the 2014 events.27 He
was not, as reported, a recent convert.
Moreover, according to Macleans, again apparently basing itself on Canadian
court records, Zehaf-Bibeaus birth name, Joseph Paul Michael Bibeau, was
changed by his parents to Joseph Paul Michael Abdallah Bulgasen Zehaf-Bibeau
when he was 13 years old.28 The change was made to acknowledge his birth
father. If this is true, this name change had nothing to do with his becoming a

13

Muslim, or converting, or with the jihadi narrative that some media sources seem
determined to play up.
The media also suggested that Zehaf-Bibeaus father had travelled to Libya
during the violent ouster of Muammar Gaddafi to join in the battle.29 Evidently,
this information was considered more useful to the jihadi narrative than the report
that this man had owned a caf in Montreal.30 Whether or not Zehaf-Bibeaus
father actually took part in the Libyan conflict I have not been able to discover. It
is troubling that the main source for this claim seems to be an article in The
Washington Times.31 This daily broadsheet, not to be confused with the
Washington Post, was created by, and is still associated with, the Unification
Church founded by the late Reverend Sun Myung Moon. Historian Thomas Frank
has called this consistently right-wing paper a propaganda sheet whose
distortions are so obvious and so alien that it puts one in mind of those official
party organs one encounters when traveling in authoritarian countries.32
As the media sought for ways to depict Zehaf-Bibeau, a powerful symbol of his
identity emerged.
The Iconic Photograph
On October 22, a photograph, apparently of the perpetrator, appeared and
quickly went out to the world. (See Appendix B.) The image brilliantly
encapsulates the terrorism with which both the government of the United States
and the government of Canada have been obsessed in recent years.
The mans scarf or kaffiyeh points to Islam.33 The rifle is held at the ready and
the handle of a long knife is suspended in front of his chest. The image conveys
the message that this is a violent man, a dangerous and frightening man. With
his scarf over his face he is also a man of secrecy and hidden intentions. Little
wonder the photograph quickly became associated with the October 22 event,
becoming a symbol of Canadian Islamic extremism.
But where did this photograph come from?
On October 23, reporter Judy Trinh, speaking on CBC News, offered her opinion
that the photograph was one of several indications that the perpetrator had not
been acting alone.34 She implied that the photographer, and the photograph, had
been part of the operation. That is, the sending of this visual message had been
planned and carried out by more than one person.
Unlike Trinh, most journalists seemed happy to accept the ever-changing claims
about the photographs origin and transmission. They appeared to be more
interested in circulating the image and giving it iconic status than in investigating
it.

14

Only very recently have evidence-based claims been put forth about the origin of
this photo. And even as the present report is being completed, serious questions
remain. (See Appendix B.)
Zehaf-Bibeaus Capacity
(1) Zehaf-Bibeaus Tools
The term tools is used here to indicate the objects carried, used, or worn by the
perpetrator that were relevant to his violent acts on October 22. They include his
Winchester rifle, .30-30 ammunition, the Toyota he drove, and a knife that he
carried. There was also the scarf or kaffiyeh.
Let us begin with the kaffiyeh. Instead of wrapping the kaffiyeh around his head
as is traditionally done in the Middle East, Zehaf-Bibeau wrapped it around his
neck. It is common in the West for those who wear a kaffiyeh to wear it around
the neck as a scarf, and it is also common for the kaffiyeh to be worn in the West
as a symbol of resistance to Western invasion and occupation of Muslim
countries. This symbolism would be consistent with the video made by ZehafBibeau and with his mothers statement that he objected to the killing of civilians
in Iraq by Western forces.35 And we have evidence (discussed later in this report)
that the words he spoke after shooting Corporal Cirillo were For Iraq!
On the other hand, it is unusual to wear the kaffiyeh in such as way as to cover
the lower half of the face. The perpetrators plan, I will argue, included his own
death, and the Independent Investigation tells us that identification documents
were found on his body. Indeed, it tells us he was carrying his wallet and
passport. But if he was carrying his identification and, moreover, intended to die,
why wear a mask?
We have been told that the perpetrator had been found, after his death, to have a
knife in his possession. In the iconic photograph of the gunman holding his rifle
we can clearly discern a handle, presumably of the knife. The Independent
Investigation says the knife was tied to his wrist with a cord. The cord was cut by
police immediately after he was killed (p. 26).
A large knife was also evident at the scene of the October 20, 2014, death of
Couture-Rouleau outside St. Jean-sur-Richelieu. Indeed, some news accounts
indicated that Couture-Rouleau was shot to death by police because he charged
them while wielding this knife.36 These accounts, however, are of doubtful
accuracy. An early account in the Toronto Star says that police shot him after he
got out of his overturned car with his hands in the air. The account, soon altered
without notification to readers, did not mention him holding a knife and did not

15

mention him charging police.37 We can find eyewitness support for the claim that
Couture-Rouleau eventually charged police, but I have not found eyewitnesses
that mention him charging them with a knife.38
Photographs of the scene show the knife stuck in the ground.39 If CoutureRouleau charged with this knife how did it end up in the ground? It appears to be
too firmly placed in the ground to have been simply dropped there. And why
would police stick it in the ground? This is not how evidence at a crime scene is
supposed to be treated. The knife of October 20 remains a mystery.

Knife at the scene of the police killing of Couture-Rouleau

Credit: The Canadian Press/Pascal Marchand

In any case, the two knives are important because they are among the elements
that tie the events of October 20 and 22 together. They may also have been
intended, by parties unknown, to tie these crimes to a wider set of terrorist
scenarios.
We know that populations in the West have been motivated to support Western
intervention in Iraq and Syria, in part, by knife beheadings by ISIL members. We
will also recall that in an attack in the United Kingdom on British soldier Lee
Rigby in 2013 the two attackers first drove their car into Rigby and then
16

attempted to behead him. This attack was, not surprisingly, referred to as an

important precedent by some journalists covering the October 20 and 22 attacks
in Canada.40 After all, Couture-Rouleau is said to have been inspired by ISIL
propaganda and to have run his car into two Canadian soldiers. A beheading
would have completed the scenario. Likewise, the RCMP apparently suggested
at one point that Zehaf-Bibeau may have had a beheading in mind.41
In his video, apparently made on October 22, Zehaf-Bibeau made no mention of
any aim that necessitated the knife, and in his later actions he made no use of
his knife, so attempts to interpret its meaning cannot get beyond speculation.
But, whatever its intended function, we need to ask where he acquired it.
So far there seems to be no firm answer to that question. RCMP Commissioner
Paulson said quite early in the investigation that Zehaf-Bibeau may have stored it
at his aunts house in Mont Tremblant, retrieving it when he stayed in the house
overnight October 2122 before driving back to Ottawa.42 He added another
claim in his March 6, 2015, presentation to the Standing Committee on Public
Safety and National Security, saying that while Zehaf-Bibeau was in Mont
Tremblant on October 2122 he was seen with a long knife.43 The name of the
witness has apparently not been released.
The RCMP suggestion that the knife had been stored at Zehaf-Bibeaus aunts
house was quickly treated as fact in some media accounts.44 But what is the
evidential basis for this claim? Zehaf-Bibeau had apparently once lived at this
location, but he seems not to have visited it for ten years.45 Did the RCMP find a
suitable location on the aunts property? Does the aunt recall seeing the knife?
Or is the RCMP simply speculating that the knife was stored at the aunts house
because he was seen with it while in Mont Tremblant on October 22?
The problem becomes even more important in relation to the rifle. The rifle was
the weapon the perpetrator chose to use, and there was an immediate
recognition, by police and media alike, that a central challenge in the
investigation would be to determine where he got it. Given his criminal record he
could not have purchased the rifle legally. Canadian practice in this respect
appears to be quite rigorous, and this makes the rifles acquisition a mystery.
Some reports have noted that the aunts home, visited by Zehaf-Bibeau, is in a
rural location where deer-hunting, and therefore hunting rifles such as the
Winchester Model 94, is common.46 Presumably we are to believe that ZehafBibeau could have acquired the rifle more easily there than in the city. But
hunters are unlikely to take the theft of a hunting rifle lightly. Do we have any
reports of such a theft? If someone gave the rifle to Zehaf-Bibeau or sold it to him
illegally that person is criminally liable. Is there a list of suspects?
Since Zehaf-Bibeaus aunts house had proved useful as a possible source of the
knife, some journalists tried to make use of it as a source of the rifle. Indeed, Mr.
Paulson himself speculated early on that the rifle may have been stored on the

17

aunts property.47 In his March 6, 2015, presentation, he added an important

claim, namely that very early in the morning October 22nd he was observed
by witnesses placing a rifle in the trunk of his car.48 Presumably, these
observations were made at the aunts property in Mont Tremblant where ZehafBibeau spent the night, but we do not know the identity of the witnesses. Mr.
Paulson acknowledged on the same occasion that we have not been able to
confirm the origins of the gun.
The truth is that not only do we, the public, not know the origins of the knife and
gun, we also have not been given solid evidence that either of them was stored
on the aunts property. Among other possibilities, Zehaf-Bibeau had at least
ninety minutes on his way to Mont Tremblant on October 21 during which he
could have received the weapons from accomplices.
A person does not usually leave a rifle somewhere for ten years and then pick it
up and load it, hoping it will work during a crucial operation. The rifle will typically
be stored in a dry location, then cleaned and oiled before being fired. Is there
evidence that the perpetrator carried out these actions?
Did the perpetrator purchase his bullets shortly before October 22? Do we have a
list of places where he might have bought them and has a seller identified ZehafBibeau? Are we going to be told that the bullets too were stored on the aunts
property? Is there evidence of this?
We were quickly told after the events of October 22, 2014, that the perpetrator
had used a cara second-hand Toyotato help him commit his crime.
Commissioner Paulson made mysterious comments about Zehaf-Bibeaus
intentions with respect to the carintentions Paulson said he would not share
with us.49 Does the Commissioner have evidence that Zehaf-Bibeau wished to
drive his car into his victims like other assailants mentioned above?
In any case, Zehaf-Bibeau had apparently used this car to drive to his aunts
house in Mont Tremblant on October 21, and it was soon suggested that he may
have acquired his weapons and ammunition during that trip. He used the car to
drive to the National War Memorial on October 22 and then from the scene of the
killing to the Elgin Street entrance to Parliament Hill. The media noted the
importance of figuring out how this homeless man had gotten hold of a car, and
the RCMP assured us that sorting this out would be high on their agenda.
Soon we were told the outlines of a solution were in place. Zehaf-Bibeau was
said to have bought the Toyota on October 21, the day before his crime, by
answering an advertisement on Kijjiji. He had paid $650 for the car but had been
unable to obtain license plates for it because he did not have the necessary
identification.50 More recently we have been told it was not identification he
lacked but car insurance (Independent Investigation, p. 4).

18

Three questions arise at once: (1) When and how did he obtain $650? (2) Did he
have help obtaining this car? and (3) Why did he buy a car when he knew he
would not be able to obtain plates?
The RCMP reported promptly that they had an answer to the first question, and
in March of 2015 Mr. Paulson confirmed that we have a full understanding of his
finances and the disbursements he made prior to the attack.51 Zehaf-Bibeau, we
are told, had worked in the oil patch in Alberta and had saved considerable
funds. Although this seems like a promising suggestion, we have apparently
been shown no evidence to support it. The Financial Post published an article
shortly after the October 22, 2014, events noting that it would have been very
difficult for Zehaf-Bibeau to have obtained work in the tar sands/oil sands sector
because applications for work there are vetted carefully and a man with his
criminal record would face serious obstacles.52 In which sector, then, did ZehafBibeau work? When did he work there and how much money did he save? We
want answers supported by evidence.
As for the second question, there were reports that Zehaf-Bibeau had, indeed,
received assistance in buying the car. But hints that he had received help at the
Ottawa Mission were discounted by the RCMP, who said there was no solid
evidence he had received assistance from people there.53
Finally, why did Zehaf-Bibeau buy a car knowing he was unable to get insurance
and to obtain plates? Surely he must have known this would put his entire plan at
risk? He was, it seems, forced to drive without plates not only on busy streets to
the War Memorial but for three hours on highways on October 21 and 22 to and
from his aunts house. It was only through good luck, presumably, that no one
picked up a cellphone during this journey and reported him. This was an odd
lapse for a man who appears cogent in his video message and who seems to
have engaged in careful advance planning of this attack.
None of the four police reports addresses the acquisition of the perpetrators
tools. Yet these acquisitions raise serious questions, including the questions of
whether he received help from others.
(2) Zehaf-Bibeaus Possible Accomplices
Although the story that Zehaf-Bibeau was alone in his crime of October 22 would
be promoted in the days following the events, this was not the dominant
message during most of the day of October 22. Moreover, even when the lone
wolf story became the official narrative (from October 23 onward) the language
used by police and media did not always make the degree of aloneness clear.
We would hear at one point that Zehaf-Bibeau acted alone on Parliament Hill, at
one point that he had acted alone in all his actions on October 22, on another

19

that although he received inspiration from others he appeared to have had no

assistance in his planning and preparation.
On October 22 itself reports that several individuals might have been directly
involved were common. I do not assume these reports are accurate. In the chaos
of events such as the October killings there are many mistakes, rumours, and
falsehoods that circulate. However, there are also sometimes important truths in
circulation in the early hours of an event that are nudged down the memory hole
as time passes and as an official narrative is put forward.
In the RCMPs report, External Engagement and Coordination, a table is
presented (pp. 67) from which the following notes have been excerpted:
10:22
10:41
10:52
10:59
11:00
11:06
11:09
11:18
11:20
12:02
12:03
12:05
12:14
12:30

Unconfirmed reports of two (2) other suspects and armed subject

on the roof of Centre Block
Suspect is down in the Library; Centre Block suspect may be
armed and on the roof of Centre Block; reports of people on roofs
and in windows
ERT reports shots fired at 366 North
ERT reports shooting at 131 Queen Street
Shots fired at Metcalfe and Sparks Street
***** [redacted]
Reports of an unidentified boat behind the Supreme Court of
Canada
Upon investigation, OPS confirm that the reports of a shooting at
131 Queen Street were unfounded
Possible suspect in the back of Parliament Hill roof (not confirmed);
Gatineau Police are checking a suspicious boat behind Parliament
Hill
OCC reports shots fired at Rideau Centre
***** [redacted]
OPS confirms that no shots were fired at Rideau Centre
***** [redacted]
Incident Commander (IC)/OPS/PMPD hear possible shots at
Centre Block on the 3rd floor

[multiple redactions follow]

18:02

OPS provide an update that as they were going to start releasing

the perimeters they received information from a witness that there
is a possibility that there are two (2) other individuals possibly
involved. Therefore, the perimeter will not be released at this time.

This RCMP table helps explain media reports that by about 11:21 a.m., Ottawa
police were investigating several shooting incidents in downtown Ottawa.54 The
OPPs RCMP Security Posture notes that up to 13 different suspects had been

20

reported in the vicinity of Parliament Hill (p. 13). And again there were several
reports of multiple active shooters (p. 21).
The RCMP table, however, leaves a great deal unexplained. The reports at 131
Queen Street and at the Rideau Centre are said to have been quickly
disconfirmedalthough neither here nor elsewhere in the document are the
errors explained. Other reports, such as the shootings at 366 North and Metcalfe
and Sparks, are neither explained nor said to have been disconfirmed, either in
the table or elsewhere in the RCMP document.
As for the Rideau Centre incident, a reader of the RCMP table might conclude
that the shooting was first reported at 12:02 p.m. and then disconfirmed three
minutes later. This is certainly not true.
The Rideau incident seems to have started in mid-morning.55 CBC Ottawa
Reporter Giacomo Panico tweeted: Shot at Rideau Centre. Police rush us
away.56 CTV Ottawa carried vdeo footage of police officers hustling civilians
from the scene and crouching with guns drawn.57
Subsequent media statements and witness accounts noted:
At 11:40 a.m. theres word of yet another shooting from policethis one a
seven minute walk from Parliament near Ottawas Rideau Centre Mall.58
A third shooting took place in Ottawa, Canada, on Wednesday morning at the
59
Rideau Centre, police say.
It appeared that the shots exchanged in or near the Rideau Centre may have
been between police officers and a shooting suspect.60
The nature of the shooting at Rideau Centre is unclear but Ottawa police
confirmed it.61 (my italics)
The RCMP table notes that suspicions of multiple shooters continued until at
least 6:02 p.m. Indeed, as late as 9 p.m. CBC Television was still reporting:
Officials declined to say whether gunman acted alone.62 On CTV evening news,
we were told that Ottawa police were still searching to see whether Zehaf-Bibeau
had been acting alone.63
Somehow, doubts had been put to rest by the afternoon of October 23, at which
time RCMP Commissioner Paulson gave a statement:
There were concerns at the initial stage of the emergency response that
there may have been more than one individual involved. Our partners at
the Ottawa Police Service and the RCMP agree that yesterday Zehaf-

21

Bibeau acted alone and that he is the same person that perpetrated the
attacks at both the National War Memorial and on Parliament Hill. The
investigation is ongoing and will rapidly determine if Zehaf-Bibeau
received any support in the planning of his attack.64
Mr. Paulsons statement was useful in distinguishing between acting alone on
October 22 and receiving support in previous stages. But how did he arrive at the
conclusion that Zehaf-Bibeau had been acting alone on October 22, a conclusion
that was quickly adopted as the truth by most of the media? (The CBCs The
National, for example, reported on the evening of October 23 that we now know
with certainty he was acting alone.)
What would constitute solid evidence that someone had been acting alone? A
reporter noted insightfully that the police, in searching Ottawa, were attempting
to prove a negative.65 Quite so, and it is notoriously difficult to prove a negative.
Did police expect to find the additional suspects by charging down Ottawa streets
in tight formations, with vests and automatic weapons, looking fearsome and
wearing masks? Perhaps these clumps of security personnel were attempting to
respond to visible dangers, not to terrorists intent on hiding, but the fact remains
that there is no kind of search of Ottawa possible in such a short space of time
that would have allowed the RCMP Commissioner to say with confidence that
Zehaf-Bibeau had acted alone.

Police on Metcalfe Street in Ottawa, Oct. 22, 2014

Credit: Tyrone Drummond

It would be more convincing if the police could explain in some detail the reasons
for their mistaken confidence on October 22 that after Zehaf-Bibeaus death a
perpetrator, or several perpetrators, were on the loose. Commissioner Paulson

22

avoided acknowledging this confidence when he said there were concerns that
more than one person had been involved. Actually, police said with certainty on
more than one occasion on October 22 that there was more than one person
involved. For example, the Toronto Star constructed an October 22 timeline,
which says that at 4:20 p.m. on October 22, Ottawa police confirm to CNN that
investigators believe there was definitely more than one person involved in the
Ottawa shooting.66 And recall the previously quoted statement: The nature of
the shooting at Rideau Centre is unclear but Ottawa police confirmed it.
Of the various reports of multiple perpetrators, among the most interesting are
those involving the War Memorial.
Construction worker Scott Walsh, who was present at the War Memorial during
that incident, appears to have been a careful and thoughtful witness. He was
working nearby, and it seems the shooting was already in progress when he
emerged from a manhole. He says the gunman at one point was five feet from
him. Here are three statements that Walsh made on October 22:
(A)
Walsh: When I came back over the fence here I saw another gentleman leaning
up against the fence here . . . he had the same type of scarf, but he didnt have a
weapon on him that I could see, but before I could really get a good, like, see
what he was wearing and stuff, I hopped back over the fence because someone
was screaming that he was involved, and then that was the last time I saw him.
Interviewer: Did you see two persons . . .
Walsh: I dont know if he was involved but he was wearing the same type of
scarf, not the same colour but the same design.
Walsh said that the first shooter, presumably Zehaf-Bibeau, was the only guy I
saw that was armed but added that the second man had the same sort of floral
design on his scarf. He was just standing by the fence here . . . he wasnt doing
anything really.67
(B)
Interviewer: You saw two people?
Walsh: Yeah, but I dont know if the second guy I saw was involved, and I dont
know if he was armed. He was just wearing a similar scarf. But the other guys
was out and covering his whole face. This guy had it tucked in [gestures] and it
covered his mouth, so . . . 68
(C)

23

I hopped the fence and looked over to my right. And there was a man with a
somewhat similar scarf, kind of tucked in and covering a bit of his mouth, and
while everyone else was freaking out and running away, he was just leaning up
against the fence with his hands in his pocket.69
It is impossible to know from the Walsh interviews whether or not this second
man was involved in the shooting at the War Memorial. Kaffiyehs, worn as
scarves, are common enough in the West these days, and there is nothing
suspect about people who wear them. But Walshs account piques our interest.
Why did someone scream at Walsh that the second man was involved? Who
was the witness who screamed and why did this man or woman draw this
conclusion? Who was the second man and why did he apparently flee the
scene (that was the last time I saw him)?
Police appear to have gathered eyewitnesses and taken them to the station to
interview them.70 Did they clear up the matter of the second man? Witness
statements about this man may have been responsible for media reports such as
this:
At 11:22 a.m. police tell CNN there may have been two or three shooters at the
War Memorial. They do believe theres another gunman at large at the moment.
He may be on the run.71
Were there connections between the second man and the reports of shots at
other locations or are these reports unconnected?
We have been led to believe that, whatever doubts the police had about ZehafBibeau having acted alone, these doubts were resolved by the afternoon of
October 23. How, precisely, did police resolve these doubtsboth with respect to
the War Memorial and with respect to other locations?
I am not claiming that Zehaf-Bibeau had help on October 22. I do not know if he
had help or not. My point is that the police have not made a case to the public for
Zehaf-Bibeau having acted alone. Affirmations and reassurances are not the
same as making a case.
Zehaf-Bibeaus Intentions
The Video Message
A video recording of Zehaf-Bibeau explaining the reasons for his October 22
attacks was described early on by the RCMP but was not shared with the public
at that time. Commissioner Paulson said, as reported in the National Post on

24

October 26, that the video was shot shortly before the attack on Corporal Cirillo
and that it gave persuasive evidence that Michael Zehaf-Bibeaus attack was
driven by ideological and political motives. Mr. Paulson added that it was not
possible to share the video at that time and said, We ask for your patience.
Mr. Paulson soon began to show even greater caution, indicating that he hoped
someday to make the video available. He added that the recording was broadly
related to Canadian foreign policy and contained a reference to Allah. He said
the recording appeared to have been made on Zehaf-Bibeaus own device. He
added that RCMP were constructing a detailed timeline to make sure no one else
was involved in the attacks.72
On Monday, December 1, Mr. Paulson further backtracked (to use Globe and
Mail reporter Josh Wingroves term). He now said that the RCMP might release
some aspects of a transcript but that he was unsure whether the video itself
would be released. He gave no coherent explanation for the changed decision.
He said the intensity of the investigation was responsible for the shift. He also
said that having regard for the nature of the investigation is what has changed.
Neither statement had useful content. He also said the RCMP were looking at
presenting evidence for some sort of court process.73 Wingrove expressed
puzzlement at this, noting that since the suspect was dead there seemed to be
no court process at issue.
As the Conservative government pushed for the passage of Bill C-51 the RCMP
suddenly decided to release the Zehaf-Bibeau video. The videotape was played
by Mr. Paulson on March 6, 2015, during his appearance before the Standing
Committee on Public Safety and National Security. Indeed, Mr. Paulson suddenly
felt that the Canadian public not only could see it but should see it. He requested
that the video, shown as part of his presentation, be broadcast live for the benefit
of all Canadians.74
This video (See Appendix C for a transcript) is important as evidence bearing on
the events of October 22 and especially as evidence of Zehaf-Bibeaus
intentions. As Mr. Paulson had noted in October of 2014, Zehaf-Bibeau appears
lucid and purposeful.
The Independent Investigation is the only one of the four police reports to make
use of this video. After misquoting a statement from the video, the report makes
a brief comment and moves on.
We can learn a good deal about Zehaf-Bibeaus perceptions and intentions from
the video. (See Appendix D for a fuller version of these comments.)
Zehaf-Bibeau exhibits piety in the video, and this is coupled with disgust at the
killing of innocents in Muslim countries. Canadas actions in Afghanistan and Iraq
are mentioned as part of this aggression, and Canadas current prime minister,

25

Stephen Harper, is explicitly named. Terror" is mentioned explicitly by ZehafBibeau, but not as what he wants to create but as what the West has brought to
Muslim countries.
Zehaf-Bibeau presents himself as a religious conservative: He wants a return to
traditional Islamic law for Muslim countries. He also sees himself as part of a
collective: We . . . the Mujahidin of this world. Within this collective he views
himself as a warrior, fighting simultaneously on an earthly and on a cosmic plane.
(This is typical of actors in religiously inspired operations of this sort.)75 In this
spirit, Zehaf-Bibeau shows no interest in killing civilians. As a warrior, he wants to
engage other warriors. He says his aim is to hit some soldiers.
It is not clear whether or not Zehaf-Bibeau wants to frighten the Canadian public.
His statement (just aiming to hit some soldiers just to show that youre not even
safe in your own land, and you gotta be careful) could mean he wants to create
general fear in the population, but it seems to me more reasonable to interpret
this to mean he wants to create fear among soldiers.
Although the distinctions I am making here may seem over-precise or even
irrelevant, they are actually very important to the issuebriefly discussed later in
this reportof whether Zehaf-Bibeau was a terrorist.
There is evidence in the video that Zehaf-Bibeau was preparing himself for a
suicide or martyrdom operation: May Allah accept from us. As we shall see, this
is supported by an analysis of his actions.
Commissioner Paulson explained during an interview with Evan Solomon on
March 7 that he had concluded that Zehaf-Bibeau received crucial assistance
from others at some point.76
Mr. Paulson did not say who the other parties might be.
Zehaf-Bibeaus Shots on October 22, 2014
The Independent Investigation does not account for all of the shots Zehaf-Bibeau
fired, nor does it account for shots he declined to fire. It therefore does not
adequately help sort out either his intentions or his capacity.
The authors of the Independent Investigation describe Zehaf-Bibeau shooting
Corporal Cirillo in the back three times, two of these shots being fired after Cirillo
had collapsed. While the claim that Corporal Cirillo had been shot in the back
three times is presumably based on forensic evidence, the report gives no source
for its statement. The considerable detail in the description of the shooting would
also have required eyewitnesses, but, again, no source is referred to (pp. 1, 4).
This leaves us with no way to verify the reports account of events. There were

26

numerous reports on October 22 of Corporal Cirillo having been shot twice in the
back.77
The report goes on to say that after shooting Corporal Cirillo, Zehaf-Bibeau, who
at this point was immediately in front of the National War Memorial, turned to his
right, raised his right hand and yelled something similar to Iraq (p. 4).
This statement does have corroboration in the public record. Hayden Trenholm, a
credible and well-positioned eyewitness, has said that the perpetrator held his
rifle in the air after the shooting of Corporal Cirillo, and said, For Iraq!78 This fits
with what Zehaf-Bibeaus mother and several of his acquaintances have alleged,
namely that he was angry about the treatment of Iraq by the West. And it also fits
with what Zehaf-Bibeau says in his video.
However, the treatment of Zehaf-Bibeaus shots themselves by the authors of the
Independent Investigation is at times misleading, with serious implications. The
report implies Zehaf-Bibeau left for Centre Block after firing three shots. This
accords with what police have been saying for some time, namely that there
were three shots fired at the War Memorial.79 But the evidence has always been
against this. There are many eyewitnesses on recordsome of the best
eyewitnesseswho say they heard more than three shots.80 At least one of
these extra shotsprobably morewas fired at Branden Stevenson, the honour
guard who was Cirillos friend and who was on duty with him at the War
Memorial. Stevenson is described clearly by eyewitnesses (the Independent
Investigation does not mention any of this) as having taken evasive action when
fired upon.81
To our surprise, we find that the Independent Investigation, within its brief
account of physical evidence toward the end of the report, records that six spent
.30-30 casings were found at the War Memorial by the forensic team (p. 36). The
report makes no attempt to reconcile this with its previous description of three
shots fired. Was Zehaf-Bibeau scattering spent casings on the ground by hand?
Was there a second shooter also firing with .30-30 cartridges? No evidence has
been brought forward to support either of these ideas. Surely this is an instance
where physical evidence must carry the day. So Zehaf-Bibeau did not shoot
three times at the War Memorial. He shot six times. It is likely, based on
eyewitness reports, that he fired about half of these shots at Corporal Cirillo and
half at Corporal Stevenson.
Zehaf-Bibeau said in his video statement that he was just aiming to hit some
soldiers. He did not say a soldier, but some soldiers. Does it not make perfect
sense that he should aim at both men? He had no personal grudge against
Cirillo. He saw himself as a warrior fighting other warriors. Soldiers were his
target.

27

But the Independent Investigation also fails to explain shots not fired. Despite the
claim of a journalist at the time that Zehaf-Bibeau was on a shooting spree,82 in
his actions at the War Memorial he does not appear to have attempted at any
point to shoot civilians. The Independent Investigation neglects to mention this or
to offer comments. Zehaf-Bibeau repeatedly ignored civilians that he could have
killed. He ran right past a woman and her baby at the War Memorial.83 He
passed five feet from Scott Walsh.84 As he ran toward the car he wished to hijack
on Parliament Hill he passed very close to a person who was walking in the
direction of Centre Block. (This can be seen clearly on the security video.)85 He
paid this person no attention and attempted no violence. He could have shot the
driver of the hijacked car but did not do so. And, just as there was a group of
civilians present at the War Memorial, so were there civilians present when he
arrived at Centre Block: He was not interested in them. The Independent
Investigation mentions some of these civilians scattering (p. 9)we can see it all
on the security video in any casebut the report does not remark on the fact that
Zehaf-Bibeau declined to fire at them. Or, again, Greta Levy, NDP press attach,
says she was close to Zehaf-Bibeau as he walked past. He made no attempt to
injure her.86
We do not know what his intentions were within Centre Block since his video
statement does not illuminate that part of his attack. Did Zehaf-Bibeau consider
the various security officers in Centre Block to be soldiers or warriors? Did he
enter Centre Block to kill them? to kill someone else? Or simply to fire and die?
We do not know.
His actions once he entered Centre Block do not clarify his intentions. The shot
that apparently ricocheted into Samearn Son was fired during a struggle, but we
do not know if Zehaf-Bibeau even intended to pull the trigger. Directly after this
incident he pointed his rifle at the chest of a second guard at close range but did
not shoot, choosing instead to run up the stairs and further into the building
(Independent Investigation, p. 10). His two subsequent shots were fired in the
general direction of security persons who were firing at him (pp. 10ff.) but we do
not know whether he considered these guards in the same category as the
soldiers he deliberately targeted at the War Memorial or whether he had a desire
to kill them.
The only things about Zehaf-Bibeaus intentions in Centre Block that we can say
with confidence, after studying both his actions and his words, are that he
intended to fire his rifle and he intended to die. We know he intended to fire his
rifle because an eyewitness notes that he racked his rifle (operated the lever,
moving a cartridge from the magazine to the chamber for firing) directly before
entering Centre Block.87 The suggestion that he intended to die comes not only
from his video statement (May Allah accept . . . ), which suggests a sacrificial
act, but from careful consideration of all the shots he fired that morning.

28

I will now attempt a task the police reports neglect, namely to account for all of
the shots Zehaf-Bibeau fired on October 22.
I will hypothesize that he began his operation at the War Memorial with fourteen
bullets, eight in his rifle and six in his pocket. (The Model 94 is usually loaded
with seven bullets but it can take eightseven in the magazine and one in the
chamber. I will assume it was loaded with the maximum of eight bullets.)
He fired six shots at the War Memorial. This left him with two bullets in the rifle.
After shooting Corporal Cirillo, Zehaf-Bibeau ran back to his car; drove down
Wellington Street to the Elgin Street entrance to Parliament Hill; ran across the
grass in front of the East Block; hijacked a car; drove past two RCMP vehicles to
Centre Block; got out of his car and proceeded through the door to the Centre
Block of Parliamentand managed all this in 3 minutes and 45 seconds.
(External Engagement, pp. 4-5). Not surprisingly, no one appears to have
reported seeing him load his rifle during this mad rush. The Model 94 is not
especially fast or convenient to load. The assumption of most commentators has
been that he did not reload between the War Memorial and Centre Block.88
In this case, Zehaf-Bibeau made his assault on Centre Block with two bullets in
his rifle. This hypothesis receives support from CBC cameraman, Jean
Brousseau, who was on the scene on October 22 and indicated in an interview
that the gunman had two bullets in his rifle, which he used up shortly after
entering Centre Block.89
Zehaf-Bibeau had, we are told, toured Centre Block on October 4,90 so he would
have been aware of the presence of guards. He would surely know that the
chances of his surviving an assault were slim if he was armed with a hunting rifle
designed in 1894 and containing two bullets.
Zehaf-Bibeau fired a shotwhether intentionally or notshortly after entering the
building, as he was struggling with a security guard. (This has been caught on
video, apparently, but we are not permitted to see the footage.) This left him with
one bullet in his rifle. His next shot appears to have been made while he was in
the rotunda, after climbing the stairs into Centre Block. He appears to have
returned the fire of one of the House of Common guards. (Independent
Investigation, p 15). He then ran down the Hall of Honour. He did not fire at this
time even though he was fired upon many times (same document, pp. 15ff.).
He found a niche by the door of the Library of Parliament. By this time he had
almost certainly been struck several times. He may have been gravely wounded.
Although the Independent Investigation notes that there was a first volley of shots
in Centre Block followed by a second volley, we can be more precise than that.
As can be determined from video- and audiotapes from Centre Block, and as is

29

confirmed by eyewitnesses, there were about 65 seconds in the gap between the
two volleys during which no shots were fired by anyone.91 This is when ZehafBibeau was in the niche by the library and when the formation of four or five
RCMP officers was walking down the middle of the Hall of Honour. The officers
had their 9mm handguns drawn and they walked towards where Zehaf-Bibeau
was hiding behind a pillar.92
In theory, Zehaf-Bibeau could have fully reloaded his rifle during this lull. A Model
94 Winchester can be completely loaded in 30-60 seconds in normal
conditions.93 But conditions were not normal. Zehaf-Bibeau was in the middle of
a gunfight, could have been rushed at any time, and was wounded. The
competence required for reloading a Model 94 was just not there. He tried to
reload but managed to get only one bullet in the rifle. He fumbled with other
bullets, dropping three of them.
My hypothesis has Zehaf-Bibeau starting the day with six bullets in his pocket.
According to the Independent Investigation, three spent .30-30 cartridges were
found in Centre Block (p. 36), while two live .30-30 rounds were found in Centre
Block and two more live rounds were found in his pocket (p. 36). We are not told
where the live rounds in Centre Block were found: I will assume they were found
on the floor near his body and that they were dropped during his attempt to
reload. The Independent Investigation adds that one damaged round was found
in Zehaf-Bibeaus clothingI will assume this too was taken from his pocket
during his attempt to reload (p. 36).
Shortly before his death, as security services were closing in, Zehaf-Bibeau is
said to have fired his third and last shot, hitting no one (Independent
Investigation, p. 26 and elsewhere). According to my hypothesis this is the only
bullet he had succeeded in loading during the break in the shooting. This implies
that when he was killed his rifle was empty. The Independent Investigation is
silent on this point, perhaps because it does little to further the project of
justifying his killing by police.
There are several assumptions in the above hypothesis, but it seems to me that it
must be close to the truth. Hopefully, the authors of the Independent
Investigation will make the required corrections.
Why does this bullet-counting matter? It bears on motive and capacity.
The way Zehaf-Bibeau used his bullets reinforces what is implied in other
evidence. He did not intend to kill a great many peopleand he was not in a
position to do soand was not interested in killing civilians. He intended to carry
out a symbolically dramatic attack, warrior on warrior, and to give his life in the
operation.

30

I am not suggesting that the officers who brought him down in Centre Block knew
of his limited aims and capacity. Whether or not these officers were justified in
killing Zehaf-Bibeau is a separate issue, which will be taken up later. But one
thing ought to be emphasized. Many statements made in the press and by public
figures after the events in Centre Block were wildly off base in their
representation of Zehaf-Bibeaus intentions and capacity.
A CBC report in the evening of October 22 claimed that the suspect may have
fired thirty shots in Centre Block.94 As the above analysis and the Independent
Investigation suggest, the number of shots he actually fired is almost certainly
three.95 The discrepancy is large. The danger Zehaf-Bibeau posed to Parliament
was misrepresented to Canadians, and it is possible many Canadians, when told
of the need for legislation such as Bill C-51, continued to harbor this
misconception.
Flawed accounts were not restricted to media. Government authorities made
their own contributions. On Anderson Coopers television show in the United
States on October 23, John Baird, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, said that
without Kevin Vickers intervention a dozen people could have been killed.96
Zehaf-Bibeau was in no position to kill that many people even if he had wanted
to. How such a serious error could have been made by Mr. Baird is a mystery.
Did no one brief the Minister before his Anderson Cooper appearance?
The cumulative effect of these errors was both to exaggerate the danger to which
Parliament had been exposed and to underestimate the rapidity of the response
by security services.

31

CANADIAN SECURITY SERVICES: WHAT WARNINGS DID THEY RECEIVE

AND WERE THEY JUSTIFIED IN KILLING ZEHAF-BIBEAU?
Terrorism Warnings
Were authorities caught unawares by the October 22 attacks? They at once said
so. RCMP Commissioner Paulson assured the Canadian public that the attacks
were carried out with no advance warning.97 Peter Mansbridge passed on this
assurance on CBCs The National: Police say the attack caught them entirely by
surprise.98
These reassurances had to contend with indications to the contrary that were
noted quickly, publicly, and repeatedly in the mainstream media.
During CBC live coverage in the afternoon of October 22, viewers witnessed
Mansbridge, together with Evan Solomon, puzzling over the rapidity of the armed
response on Parliament Hill.99 Solomon claimed (he had been at the scene
quickly) that there were fully outfitted tactical units rolling onto Parliament Hill in
heavy vehicles by 10:11 a.m.100 The shooting in Centre Block had started at
about 9:54 a.m. Mansbridge remarked on the speed of the response. Did the
rapid response, he wondered, come from a heightened threat level, an
awareness that an attack of some sort might have been imminent?101
Journalists were speculating because they had been receiving reports that
warnings of a possible terrorist attack had, in fact, been issued.
Mansbridge first noted that journalists had been told the previous week that the
terrorist threat level in Canada had been raised.102 There seemed initially to have
been considerable openness about this raising of the threat level. For example,
the Toronto Star reported (video presentation on Thestar.com) on October 22,
2014: The act comes just after Canadas threat level had been elevated to
medium for the first time since 2010.
CBCs The National added that the warning had come from the Integrated
Terrorism Assessment Centre (ITAC) housed in CSIS.103 But, a frustrated Peter
Mansbridge noted on October 22, when his team had tried to look more deeply
into this warning they were told that absolutely it was not true.104
All reports of a raised threat level in the country raised two questions. First, why
had the Canadian public not been aware of the existence of formal threat levels
previously? The US colour code scheme for indicating threat level was well
known but, insisted a CBC Radio journalist on October 22, journalists in Canada
had been told by the government that Canada had no terrorist threat level rating
system.105 The journalist claimed that only recently they had learned such a
system existed. The second question was why, if a threat level rating system

32

existed and if warnings had actually been issued, the threat level at Parliament in
Ottawa had not been raised. Gilles Michaud, RCMP Assistant Commissioner,
said on October 22 that the threat level at Parliament had been stable for years
at medium. The threat level on Parliament Hill, weve been operating at the
medium level for the past number of years, and thats the level that were
operating at right now.
Presumably, we were supposed to believe that elsewhere in Canada the threat
level may have been raised to medium, but it was not necessary to raise the
threat level on Parliament Hill since it was already at medium.
A spokesperson for Public Safety Minister Blaney further suggested that Canada
had raised its domestic terror threat level from low to medium due to an
increase in general chatter from radical Islamist organizations.106
General chatter picked up by intelligence agencies also figured in a US warning
around the same time that concerned threats to military personnel and police in
the US. CNN reported on October 22 that the FBI and the Department of
Homeland Security had sent a warning bulletin in the past week or so and after
intelligence picked up chatter from ISIS members, urging attacks against
government officials in the US, including law enforcement and military
personnel.107
But there was more information to come. Peter Mansbridge noted, again on
October 22, that within the last week to ten days NBC led one of their newscasts
with a pretty firm report in terms of how sure they were of it, of potential terror
threats inside Canada.108 Indeed, as early as October 8, NBC claimed to have
been told by US intelligence officials that Canadian authorities have heard
would-be terrorists discussing potential ISIS-inspired knife and gun attacks
inside Canada.109
Both the October 20 and 22 events in Canada involved suspects with knives, and
in the second case there was a gun as well. This warning sounds more specific
than the general chatter spoken of by Mr. Blaneys office. What was the basis of
the warnings? Who was, and who was not, informed of these threats? Why was
the threat level at Parliament not raised?
But there was more news. On the morning of October 22, Craig James, a Clerk
of the British Columbia legislature, said,
We are aware and have been aware of a heightened concern from entities
in Ottawa for at least a few days. We . . . received information that there
may be a problem this week. We had discussions with certain members of
the assembly to be prudent . . . 110

33

It soon became clear that Mr. James was not the only one to have received a
warning. In British Columbia, various individuals, including the Attorney General
and the Finance Minister, acknowledged they had received recent warnings
(ranging from a week before the Ottawa attacks to as recent as Monday, Oct 20).
Journalist Michael Smyth of The Province asked the obvious question: So our
provincial politicians [in B.C.] and legislative security staff were well-briefed by
the feds here, but the RCMP in Ottawa got taken by surprise? What is wrong with
this picture?111
The warnings, it turned out, had not been restricted to British Columbia. Those
in charge of security at Canadian parliaments across Canada had received the
warnings.112
On November 24, 2014, a story broke in the media that added new fuel to the fire
of controversy. The story raised questions about the actions of some agencies
and the inaction of others.
It turned out that the Privy Council Office (PCO), which acts as advisor to the
Prime Minister, had issued a warning on October 17, 2014, three days before the
Quebec events and five days before those in Ottawa.113 The memo (see
Appendix E) warned of a potential violent act of terrorism in Canada. It had
been circulated Friday evening, October 17, but some relevant parties appear not
to have received in until Monday, October 20, the day of the Quebec attack.
The heading of the Privy Council memo is HEIGHTENED STATE OF
ALERTNESS. The memo portrays the warning as having originated with the
threat notice issued by the Integrated Threat Assessment Centre (ITAC), which is
housed in CSIS and has numerous federal partners including the RCMP. In
addition to general statements about the need for vigilance, the memo from the
PCO contains instructions such as validate communications and notification
protocolse.g., internal communications to staff, emergency phone line,
emergency notification system.
The memo also says first responders will be notified of the warning.
Context is important in assessing the significance of such warnings. Are these
warnings regular occurrences that provoke nothing but yawns? Apparently not.
CBCs Terry Milewski noted:
The raising of the threat level to medium on October 17 was not routine
it was the first time that happened in more than four years, since August
2010. In raising it, ITAC reported that intelligence indicates that an
individual or group within Canada or abroad has the intent and capability
to commit an act of terrorism. ITAC assesses that a violent act of
terrorism could occur.114

34

The discovery of this memo in late November 2014 was immediately

accompanied by questions as to why the relevant agencies, including the RCMP,
had not been better prepared for the October 22 events. Steve Day, former
commander of Canadas special forces, and Garry Clement, former RCMP
superintendent, were quoted in the media to this effect.115
Milewski added that the emails accompanying the memo had recommended that
the warnings not be passed on to the public or the media.116
When queried about the memo and the warnings, Mr. Blaney (Minister of Public
Safety) and a spokesperson for the RCMP refused to comment.117 Apparently,
the Canadian public was neither to be warned in advance of the danger of a
terrorist attack nor to be told after the fact why the response to the warning had
been deficient.
Instead of offering mild criticisms of the weak preparations on Parliament Hill,
why are we not asking whether the two soldiers killed on October 20 and 22
would still be alive if the warning had been shared more widely?
Peter Mansbridges question about the state of readiness near Parliament Hill
could, after the release of the PCO warning, be acknowledged as a good
question. It is likely that the tactical units that almost immediately made their
appearance on Parliament Hill had, indeed, been in a state of heightened
preparation after receiving the PCO memo or the preceding ITAC warning. In
addition, the Prime Ministers smug pronouncements, immediately after both
October incidents, that Canada was facing terrorism are more understandable.
Staff in the PCO directly advising him had issued the October 17 terrorism
warning.
How specific was the timing in the warning? In the PCO memo we are told that,
there is no information indicating that an attack is imminent, but we will
remember that Craig James was under the impression that there may be a
problem this week. Was the information James received contained in the email
accompanying the PCO warning or had he received it through other channels?
Many questions remain. What, for example, was the relation between the ITAC
information and the warnings of an imminent terrorist incident in Canada
announced in the United States (for example, the Oct. 8 NBC warning)? And
what was the state of preparation on Parliament Hill? On the one hand, the
tactical units showed up quickly. On the other hand, in crucial respects security
services seemed to have been appallingly unprepared. House of Commons
security guards were apparently not warned of Zehaf-Bibeau by the 911 service,
although numerous calls about the War Memorial shooting were received
immediately; nor by the Ottawa police who were responding to the War Memorial
shooting; nor even by the RCMP, two of whose vehicles were passed by ZehafBibeau after he hijacked a vehicle on Parliament Hill and drove to Centre

35

Block.118 The RCMP report on its response on Parliament Hill notes poor radio
communication as one of the causes of faulty coordination (External
Engagement, p. 16). But the PCO memo issued on October 17 specifically says
to validate communications and notification protocolse.g., internal
communications to staff, emergency phone line, emergency notification system.
Why were these instructions not followed on Parliament Hill when legislatures
elsewhere in the country were apparently acting on the warnings?
And why does not a single one of the four police reports released to the public, at
least in the redacted forms available to us, even mention the ITAC and PCO
warnings? How can the quality of the response of any of the relevant agencies
be assessed if the warnings are not acknowledged and taken into account?
Moreover, is it actually true that the threat level at Parliament had not been
raised in recent years (that it had been at medium for years, as Mr. Michaud
said on October 22)? If so, what are we to make of the fragmentary statement in
the OPP report, RCMP Security Posture, completed in March 2015:
In January 2013, the RCMPs threat assessment of Parliament Hill was
determined to be at a *****. This proved to be even more challenging in
maintaining the level of resources required for this area (p. 8).
Despite the redaction, the statement clearly implies that in January 2013 the
threat assessment at Parliament was raised. This, we are to understand, put an
additional strain on RCMP resources. Later in the document we are told that the
January 2013 threat assessment was sufficiently worrisome that the RCMP was
not prepared to deal with this type of threat due to lack of planning, training and
resources (p. 20).
And how odd it is that the RCMP, the agency that most emphatically ignored the
warnings and failed to make preparations, was, in February 2015, given
increased authority in the House of Commons, the institution its failures on
October 22 had put at risk (see House of Commons Incident Response, p. 8).
To sum up: Three days prior to the first of two successful acts of jihadi violence
in Canada, a warning of terrorism was issued by the Prime Ministers advisory
body based on advice from the Canadian intelligence community as represented
by ITAC. The warning was interpreted by at least some who received it as
referring to this week, the week of the two attacks. Both the type of attack and
the type of warning were, and are, extremely rare in Canada. The warning called
for concrete preparations, which, if implementedand especially if shared with
the publicmight have frustrated both attacks. The concrete preparations
recommended were largely ignored where they were most needed, on
Parliament Hill. Police reports have declined to discuss the warning and have
therefore been grossly inadequate. The main body punished for the failures to

36

heed the terrorism warning has been the Canadian public, whose civil rights have
been reduced through a series of bills passed in the wake of the attacks.
There are strongly grounded conclusions we can formulate on the basis of this
information. One conclusion is that Commissioner Paulson was lying when he
said that the RCMP had received no warning. The RCMP is one of the federal
partners in ITAC and would have been immediately given relevant information.
Another conclusion is that Assistant Commissioner Michaud, who said the threat
level at Parliament had not been raised in recent years, was also not telling the
truth. A third conclusion is that while some police were apparently prepared (the
tactical units), others acted so slowly it is hard to believe they had been given the
warnings.
On October 22, Peter Mansbridge assured his audience that, given its
importance, the question of advance warning would be pursued assertively by
Members of Parliament in both the House of Commons and parliamentary
committees, as well as by journalists from coast to coast.119 Has it been pursued
assertively? No evidence of this could be seen when Mr. Paulson made his
appearance before the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National
Security on March 6, 2015. Why have Parliamentarians and newspaper editors
not called for Mr. Paulsons resignation?
The Killing of Zehaf-Bibeau
The stated task of the Independent Investigation was look into the shooting
death of Michael ZEHAF-BIBEAU that occurred on October 22, 2014 (p. 3). The
Ontario Provincial Police conducted this investigation at the request of the
RCMP.
After considering the evidence set forth in their report, the investigators reached
the conclusion that the use of lethal force was justified. More specifically, the
OPP has concluded that the six involved officers acted reasonably and that their
conduct is entitled to the protection of section 34 of the Criminal Code. The force
was justifiable and there are no reasonable and probable grounds for any
Criminal Code charges in relation to the death of Michael ZEHAF-BIBEAU (p.
40).
Several of the weaknesses of this report have already been listed. Clearly, no
attempt was made to approach the standards that would have been in force in a
trial. But there are further weaknesses that combine to undermine the readers
faith in the investigators conclusions.
Political Framing of the Investigation

37

As will be explained later, the great majority of weapons-related terrorism cases

that come before the courts in North America involve state security agencies
assisting the perpetrators. This astonishing fact makes it especially important that
investigations of the killing of suspects be handled scrupulously.
Kevin Vickers, sergeant-at-arms and head of House of Commons security on
October 22, was an active participant in the killing of the suspect. So was RCMP
Constable Curtis Barrett. Both men were widely praised for their actions. Barrett
was given a standing ovation by the NDP on October 22.120 The following day
Vickers received a prolonged standing ovation from all parties in the House of
Commons when he made his usual ceremonial entrance carrying the mace.121
At what point does spontaneous appreciation of acts of courage and selflessness
become interference with a police investigation? In Vickers case the line was
crossed quickly. Vickers went to Israel three weeks after the October 22 events,
where he was invited to meet Israels Prime Minister and other high-ranking
government officials and was honoured by the Israeli parliament, the Knesset.
Prime Minister Netanyahu informed the world that this terror attack in Ottawa
proves, once again, that Islamic radical terrorism has no limits and respects no
borders. He added that Israel and Canada stand side-by-side in the
international effort to eliminate terrorism.122
Why on earth did the government of Canada permit Vickers to take this trip?
Vickers was under investigation for a killing, while Israel had just carried out a
violent assault on Gaza (Operation Protective Edge, July 7Aug. 28, 2014) and
was responsible for many acts the United Nations Human Rights Council says
may qualify as war crimes.123 Eager for international support during a time of
widespread condemnation, Mr. Netanyahu clasped Vickers to his bosom.
As if this were not bad enough, the Prime Minister of Canada then appointed Mr.
Vickers ambassador to Ireland, effective January 19, 2015. Mr. Harper,
124
commenting on the appointment, noted Vickers tremendous acts of heroism.
All this took place while Vickers was under investigation.
Whatever the purity of the aims of the OPP investigators, they were obviously
operating in a context of political commitments and expectations. How
embarrassing it would have been, to the Prime Minister and to the government of
Canada, if the new and much praised ambassador to Ireland were found to have
engaged in unlawful killing!
Was the Killing of Zehaf-Bibeau Justified?
Many Canadians view Kevin Vickers and Curtis Barrett, the two men most
directly responsible for Zehaf-Bibeaus death, as heroes, who risked their lives to

38

protect Parliament. They may well be right. But in this case the Independent
Investigation does these men a disfavor. By avoiding the real questions it leaves
us with doubts.
According to the Independent Investigation the total number of shots fired at
Zehaf-Bibeau in Centre Block was 56. This seems to be a solid figure since it
was determined by counting spent casings in the building (pp. 36, 40). Of the 56
bullets, it appears that approximately 27 were fired in the first volley and
approximately 29 in the second (pp. 1-2). The number of shots that wounded
Zehaf-Bibeau was 31, based on an examination of his body. Of these 31 shots, 4
to 8 shots were classified as potentially fatal, meaning that any one of them
could have led to his death if he had not received prompt medical attention.
Another 2 shots were classed as rapidly fatal, meaning either one of them was
capable of ending his life immediately (pp. 3-4).
Six 9mm handguns were fired during the exchange (p. 36). These included the
main handguns that ended Zehaf-Bibeaus life, which were wielded by House of
Commons security head Kevin Vickers and RCMP Constable Curtis Barrett
neither is named in the redacted report but we know their names from elsewhere.
Zehaf-Bibeaus refusal to go down during the first volley seemed at one point to
support the hypothesis that he was wearing body armour. (See Appendix F.) But
the Independent Investigation does not mention body armour, and surely its
authors would not deceive the public by omitting such an important fact?
Assuming this is so, it seems that Zehaf-Bibeau was still standing after 27 shots
not because he was wearing body armour but because only about 6 of these
shots actually hit him, and none was immediately fatal. (Again, see Appendix D.)
The Independent Investigation, surprisingly, has no comment on this issue.
The two officers most intimately involved in the killing of Zehaf-Bibeau fired at
him at very close range during the second major volley. Zehaf-Bibeau was
already wounded and had fired his third and final shot. As suggested earlier, his
rifle was likely empty after that third shot. According to the Independent
Investigation, Officer Barrett then started firing at Zehaf-Bibeau from four metres
distance and kept firing as he walked directly toward the suspect. He ended up
firing from within feet, presumably meaning from less than two metres.
Altogether he fired 15 (or 14the report is inconsistent) shots during this period
and in his view every one of them hit the suspect (pp. 26, 36). Shortly before this
Kevin Vickers jumped or rolled from his hiding place and began firing at the
suspect at very close range. Zehaf-Bibeau, we are told in the report, collapsed to
his knees as soon as he was hit by Vickers first shots. Although we are not given
a detailed timeline, Zehaf-Bibeau, as he continued to absorb shots, collapsed
further into a prone position. At some point in this process Vickers moved into a
sitting position and continued emptying his handgun into Zehaf-Bibeau from a
distance of about one metre (pp. 21-22; 37).

39

How many shots were fired into Zehaf-Bibeau after he had collapsed, either
partly or completely? The OPP investigators do not seem interested in the
question and do even not raise it. What we do know is that several shots,
including the two rapidly fatal ones, appear to have been delivered after at least
partial, and probably total, collapse. Although Zehaf-Bibeau was initially facing
his last two attackers, neither of the rapidly fatal shots hit him in the front. One hit
him in the back of the neck and penetrated his brain and one hit him in the upper
back and penetrated his heart (pp. 33-34).
Most, if not all, of the four-to-eight potentially fatal shots also hit Zehaf-Bibeau in
the back (p. 34). How many were fired during the last seconds of the
engagement when the suspect was already down? The investigators do not say
and do not seem to care.
A 2010 study of a RCMP killing by the Police Policy Studies Council in the United
States notes that RCMP policy pertaining to the use of force affords its
constables a reasonable degree of situational latitude in determining what level
of force is most applicable. The study also notes, however,
For at least two decades, the police firearms training community has stressed
two prevailing engagement principles in deadly force encounters. They are
Fire until your foe falls.
Aim for the center mass of the target available.125
The first of these principles is certainly relevant to the killing of Zehaf-Bibeau, but
the OPP authors of the Independent Investigation do not directly refer to it. The
closest they come is when they say it is reasonable to believe that these officers
perceived a continuing threat up to the point where ZEHAF-BIBEAU was felled
and the gunfire went silent (p. 40). But what does this mean? As far as we can
determine Zehaf-Bibeau was felled first and then killed. As for the gunfire going
silent, Zehaf-Bibeau had stopped shooting well before he was killed. Were the
security officers allowed to keep shooting until their own gunfire fell silent?
The authors make an indirect attempt to justify the continued shooting of the
suspect by claiming that Officer Barrett was worried Zehaf-Bibeau might have
been wearing an explosive belt and by claiming that the officers needed tangible
evidence the suspect was no longer a threat (pp. 26, 40).
The problem with concerns about an explosive belt is that this argument could be
used to justify the killing of any alleged terrorist. As for the second claim, surely
the principle quoted above (stop firing when the suspect falls) is meant to
establish, quite precisely, a criterion for tangible evidence. Why were the officers
in this case justified in rejecting this criterion?

40

The fact is that the authors of the Independent Investigation make only a very
general argument for the justifiability of the killing. Essentially, they say that the
officers had a right to shoot the suspect given his actions at the War Memorial
and in Centre Block, and given the clear risk he represented to the officers and to
others, including Members of Parliament, in the building. But does anyone
question this basic claim? The question that must be asked is much more
specific: Were the officers justified in killing Zehaf-Bibeau with repeated shots at
very close range after he had collapsed?
The OPP investigators do not raise this question. Moreover, they also mislead
the reader during their project of exonerating the officers who killed Zehaf-Bibeau
by telling a half-truth and by giving irrelevant information.
In establishing the danger Zehaf-Bibeau represented to security officers, the
OPP authors support their argument by saying he had already shot one officer in
Centre Block. They are referring to Samearn Son. But the police have made it
clear Son was hit by a ricochet during a struggle.126 Zehaf-Bibeaus intentions are
not clear. We do not even know if he intended to pull the trigger. We do know he
declined to shoot a second officer immediately after this incident although he
could have done so (p. 10).
Samearn Son did not even know he was wounded until after he exited Centre
Block,127 so it is hard to see how the officers who killed Zehaf-Bibeau could have
known he was wounded. And if they did not know he was wounded, how does
the wounding justify their killing of the suspect?
In a similar vein, the authors tell us the story of the shooting of Cirillo in some
detail, making clear Zehaf-Bibeaus intent to kill and painting a vivid picture of
Corporal Cirillos death. But they do not establishand they do not even try to
establishthat any of the officers who shot Zehaf-Bibeau in Centre Block were
aware of these facts about the War Memorial shooting at the time they killed
Zehaf-Bibeau. So how are the War Memorial facts relevant to the justifiability of
the shooting?
If Zehaf-Bibeaus killing of Cirillo at the War Memorial is relevant as a proof, after
the fact, of his intent to kill, why are his (presumably) empty rifle, his multiple
wounds, and his lack of a bomb or suicide beltall discovered after his death
not relevant as evidence of his incapacity for further lethal action?
It is not acceptable to refer to facts unknown to the officers in the one case and to
refuse to do so in the other case.

41

WAS ZEHAF-BIBEAU A TERRORISTIF SO, WHAT KIND?

RCMP Commissioner Paulson told the Canadian public in March 2015 that
Zehaf-Bibeau, had he lived, would have been charged by the RCMP with
terrorism. (In fact, although Mr. Paulson insisted in his appearance in the C-51
hearings that he was not supporting any political agenda, he managed to use the
word terrorist nine times in his brief remarks.) Mr. Paulson reminded us on the
same occasion that he must work with the definition of terrorism given in
Canadas Criminal Code.128
Indeed, if the courts had found Zehaf-Bibeau guilty of terrorism, conviction would
in large part have depended on the peculiar and politically shaped understanding
of terrorism in the Canadian Criminal Code.129 The Canadian interpretation,
despite its two-page sprawl, omits one of the elements typically considered
essential to terrorism, namely purposeful violence against civilians.130 If we were
working with a definition that included this element and that would widely be
recognized as valid outside Canada, it is not at all clear that Zehaf-Bibeau
committed an act of terrorism. We do not know what his intentions were in Centre
Block, while his actions outside Centre Block, and his aim as stated in his video
statement, do not supply convincing evidence that he was purposefully targeting
civilians. Likewise, as explained earlier, we do not know if Zehaf-Bibeau intended
to create fear in the general population, another factor that is frequently
considered essential (although not in Canadas Criminal Code) to terrorism.
Nothing I am saying, here or elsewhere in this report, is meant to exonerate the
suspect, morally or legally. Had Zehaf-Bibeau survived he should certainly have
been charged with several crimes, including murder. But not all murder is
terrorism.
For the purposes of the following discussion, I will not attempt to give a definitive
answer to the question of whether Zehaf-Bibeau was a terrorist but will ask
where, if he was a terrorist of some sort, he might fit in the ranks of terrorists.
Types of Terrorism Currently Common in North America
In 2013, an important study of FBI operations against alleged US domestic
terrorism was published.131 Author and investigative journalist Trevor Aaronson
noted that the FBI was reorganized after the 9/11 attacks so that domestic
terrorism would be its top priority. The Bureau was receiving, at the time of
publication of Aaronsons book, about $3 billion per year for anti-terrorist activity
out of a total annual budget of $7.8 billion. This represented a larger proportion of
the budget than that allocated to organized crime.132

42

With this high priority support, prosecution of (mainly Muslim) terrorists became a
major activity of the Bureau. Aaronson discovered that there were 508
prosecutions for terrorism-related crimes in the United States between
September 11, 2001, and August, 2011.133
This seems like a great deal of domestic terrorism. But Aaronson, searching
carefully through the court records of each case, eventually concluded that only a
tiny fraction of these cases involved what most people would regard as real
terrorists, that is, persons with both the determination and capacity to carry out
serious violence (typically with guns or bombs).134
Aaronson also came to the conclusion that Islamic terrorism in the United States
is not an immediate and dangerous threat.135
The solution to the apparent contradiction between high levels of prosecution and
low levels of actual terrorist threat is found in the FBIs method.
The common method was, and is, to find a young Muslim mantypically a poor
man who is living on the fringes of mainstream societywho has engaged in
jihadi talk, possibly in face-to-face conversation and possibly on the Internet. In
some cases the man will have grandiose fantasies of himself, or he will be
someone who expects to make money from the operation. But the FBI has also
gotten results by playing on genuine moral outragefor example, outrage
against US actions in Iraq. FBI undercover operatives do not hesitate to suggest
vengeance to the young man: We will teach these bastards a good lesson.136
The FBI operative, taking on the role of jihadi and enabler, attempts to bring the
potential terrorist, through a series of stages, to the point of actually attempting to
carry out a violent action of some kind. According to Aaronson and several other
students of this method, the FBI operative, who often supplies the means
necessary for completion of the act (gun, bomb, and so on), finds it easy to
substitute an inoperative weapon before the target pulls the trigger, pushes the
button, or whatever it may be. At the moment of the failed attempt the FBI
officers swoop in and arrest the duped target, who is typically found guilty on
terrorism-related charges by a jury (despite the defence lawyers attempts to
argue that the client was entrapped) and sentenced to many years in prison.137
It is not uncommon for the enablers used against the target by the FBI to have
criminal records and to have proven skills in lies and deception. After a
successful netting of a terrorist they may be sent off to another part of the
United States to repeat their jihadi performance and net someone new.138
Both the FBI as an organization and its terrorist enablers have financial
incentives to produce and trap terrorists. The Bureau has its $3 billion per year.
As for the enablers, they are, of course, paid for their work, but many also get a
bonus if the person targeted is convicted of terrorism in court.139

43

This well-lubricated system functions to produce a steady supply of pseudoterroristsabout one every sixty days in 2013. Aaronson calls it a terror
factory.140
Since the FBI was unable to find major terrorist networks or groups operating in
the United States, they decided to concentrate on what they call the lone wolf.
This decision was made years before the solemn debates on Canadian television
in the days following October 22 about the problems of dealing with lone wolf
terrorists. Neither the idea nor the language was new in October 2014; moreover,
the strategy for dealing with supposed lone wolves was well advanced. The FBI
took as its central purposes: (1) identifying potential lone wolves, and (2) moving
141
them to the next stage.
What this actually amounts to is making these unstable and isolated people into
terrorists.
Aaronson often refers to FBI-assisted operations as sting operations,142 but
they are different from traditional stings in at least two crucial respects.
First, in traditional stings the person targeted, or his/her organization, is capable
of carrying out the crime without the FBI operative, whereas in many of the
operations at issue here the persons working for the FBI are essential to the
carrying out of the crime: It was FBI informants who provided the ideas, the
means, and the opportunities for horrific plots.143 Again of the more than 150
terrorism sting operation defendants, an FBI informant not only led one of every
three terrorist plots, but also provided all the necessary weapons, money, and
transportation.144
Secondly, in traditional stings a crime of a certain kind is already occurring and
the police asset or agent observes or participates in this existing criminal activity.
This is why in the Wikipedia article on sting operations (accessed March 6,
2014) examples such as the following are given:
Deploying a bait car (also called a honey trap) to catch a car thief
An undercover officer posing as a prostitute to raid illegal solicitation
An undercover officer posing as a hitman to prevent potential murder-for-hire
In the FBIs terrorist initiatives the duped target may have had a criminal record,
but typically had no history of terrorist activity. (Canadas John Nuttall, speaking
to an RCMP mole: Ive never done this before. Im new to this.)145 The FBI,
through its enablers, turned the target into a terrorist. Then, and only then, could
he or she be charged with, and convicted of, terrorism.

44

For these two reasons the term sting should not, in my view, be used for these
operations. I propose that the terms Managed Terrorism and Managed
Terrorist be used instead.
The FBI, according to Aaronson, has concentrated almost exclusively on Muslim
communities, claiming that at any time, in any community, some could radicalize
and become a terrorist, with a bomb, a gun, even with household chemicals.146
Yet he points out that there are no reliable data suggesting Muslims as a
community in the United States are any more apt to approve of violent extremism
than members of other religious communities.147 Why, in that case, are there
thousands of people tasked with infiltrating Muslim communities? It would seem
that in other global political contexts Hindus could be targeted in a similar way, or
Jews, Buddhists or Christians. The factory has been constructed to support the
War on Terror and its central assumptions.
This factory is already operating in Canada. The RCMPs 2006 initiative against
the Toronto 18, repeatedly referred to by journalists in the wake of the October
2014 attacks, is a case in point. The accused, it was implied at the time of their
arrest, had been involved in acquiring deadly weapons. But the 9mm handgun
had been supplied by a police mole, the same police mole (at the time a drug
addict) who gave the group members weapons training. And the attempt to get
hold of ammonium nitrate for the construction of an ammonium nitrate fuel oil
bomb had been facilitated by a second police mole, who was paid over $4 million
by the RCMP for his contribution.148
But why not take a more recent case? In 2013 the RCMP arrested a BC couple,
John Nuttall and Amanda Korody, for attempting to set off three bombs on the
grounds of the BC legislature on Canada Day (July 1). This couple, having
apparently self-converted to Islam, have been described by Vancouver Sun
journalist Ian Mulgrew as impoverished, troubled drug addicts.149
Nuttall and Korody were befriended in early 2013 by an officer pretending to be
an Arab businessman with extremist connections. Over the following months, he
encouraged their Islamic militance and introduced them to other Mounties acting
as jihadis.150 More than 240 members of the RCMP were involved in this
entrapment exercise.151
Over the following months, the [RCMP] corporal encouraged their extremism,
bought Nuttall a suit (because his only other outfit was army pants, a Surrey Tshirt and leather jacket), paid him for meaningless jobs, gave him money for
groceries, all the while pressing him to formulate a viable terrorist plot.152
On the audio tapes of police interactions with Nuttall, the RCMP mole can at one
point be heard berating Nuttall for, in the words of Canadian Press journalist
Geordon Omand, his poorly researched plan to hijack a Via Rail passenger train
in Victoria that no longer exists. After criticizing Nuttall for his poor research the

45

mole can be heard saying, Im here to make what you have in your head come
true, what you want in your heart to be a reality.153
In other words, Nuttall had been indulging in fantasies. His plans were not rooted
in the real world. Since evil thoughts are not criminal in Canada, the job of the
police was to make the thoughts become reality. Then a crime would come into
beingand then terrorism would come into being.
In the end, the RCMP operatives convinced Nuttall to build pressure-cooker
bombs, helped him build them, and assured him they would supply the required
explosive substance. Then they found him a nice place for the bombs on the
grounds of the BC legislature.154
In these acts of politicized entrapment, the RCMP has already been working
closely with the FBI. Consider the trial of Raed Jaser and Chiheb Esseghaier,
accused of planning a Via passenger train derailment and found guilty on
terrorism-related charges in March 2015. Testimony crucial to the case was
given by an undercover FBI agent. The officer posed as a wealthy EgyptianAmerican real estate developer. He bought the two accused plotters meals,
drove them to scouting locations and handed out cash, and so onthe standard
FBI methods.155 But in this case the police, Canadian and American, worked
together to create credible terrorists.
Returning to the events of October 2014, the CBCs The National noted five
similarities between the suspect in the October 22 attack and the suspect
(Couture-Rouleau) in the attack in Quebec two days earlier:156

They came from broken homes.

They were adrift.
They used drugs heavily.
They may have suffered from mental illness.
They had self-radicalized.

These are, indeed, interesting similarities. They have been used to support two
alternative theories, the theory of the unstable individual who operates alone and
the theory of the unstable individual who becomes the prey of an Islamic terrorist
organization. But there is a third possibility: These men could have been unstable
individuals who became the prey of security and intelligence operatives.
Was Zehaf-Bibeau a Managed Terrorist?
Slightly more than a month before the October events (September 16, 2014) a
press release from the Buffalo Division of the FBI announced that a federal grand
jury in Rochester had just returned a seven-count indictment charging a
Rochester man, Mufid Elfgeeh, with a variety of crimes, including attempted

46

murder of members of the US military.157 Other charges included attempting to

provide material support and resources to ISIL and possessing firearms
equipped with silencers in furtherance of a crime of violence. Mr. Elfgeeh was 30
years old when charged.
Mr. Elfgeeh had allegedly told a friend that he was thinking about getting a gun
and ammunition, putting on a bulletproof vest, and just go[ing] around and start
shooting.
It turned out that, as in most cases of domestic terrorism in the United States, Mr.
Elfgeehs fantasies had been supported by the FBI. Two of his closest terrorist
associates, whom he was allegedly helping to send to Syria to fight for ISIL, were
working for the FBI. One of these men had supplied the handguns, together with
ammunition and silencers, necessary for the plan to kill soldiers. The FBI press
release did not say who first came up with the idea of killing soldiers.
Mr. Elfgeehs handguns were made inoperable by the FBI before the confidential
source gave them to Elfgeeh, and Elfgeeh was seized as soon as he took
possession of the guns.
Directly after the FBI press release was issued, investigative journalist Tony
Cartalucci wrote an article noting that missing mechanisms in two firearms
provided to a potential terrorist were the only thing that prevented this latest
case of entrapment from going live.158 Citing known and authentic instances
where US intelligence agencies had, indeed, allowed or planned to allow terrorist
actions to go live against Western populations, Cartalucci said, It is clear that
the FBI can at any time through design or disastrous incompetence, turn one of
their contrived entrapment cases into a live terror attack. After a brief discussion
of similar developments in Australia, Cartalucci issued his warning, published on
September 18, 2014:
That the FBI and Australian authorities are coordinating staged security
operations in tandem on opposite ends of the globe to terrify their
respective populations into line behind an impending war with Syria
suggests a new Operations Northwoods of sorts is already being
executed.
Operation Northwoods was the notorious 1962 plan by the Pentagon and the CIA
to carry out a number of deceptive acts of violence, including a terrorist attack in
the United States, in order to frame Cuba and provide a justification for an
invasion of that country.159
After the two attacks in Canada of October 20 and 22 Cartalucci wrote a followup article, noting At least two live attacks have now been carried out in
Canadaprecisely as they were predicted. He added It is very likely
undercover agents were involved in either one or both cases.160

47

The possibility that the October 22 events may have been an instance of
Managed Terrorism was given credibility on the very day of the attack on
Parliament Hill by a report from CBC journalist Adrienne Arsenault.161 Arsenaults
comment came during an otherwise unremarkable discussion of the days events
by an assembly of experts. No doubt many in the CBCs audience were alarmed
to learn from her that while police may have been surprised by the details of the
days attack, they could hardly claim to have been surprised by either the
scenario or the timing. This precise scenario, she said, has been keeping them
up at night for a while. She explained that within the previous month the National
Security Task Force, the RCMP, and CSIS had run a scripted scenario that
involved an attack in Quebec followed by an attack in another city, followed by
an event involving men returning from fighting in Syria. She commented that we
are seeing that now. Indeed, on October 20 we had an attack in the province of
Quebec and it was immediately followed by an attack in another city (Ottawa).
The attack by returnees from Syria did not take place, but the RCMP did not
hesitate to link both October suspects to fighting in Syria, using deception when
necessary to make the link.162
The questions raised earlier in this report about how Zehaf-Bibeau acquired the
tools necessary for his attack and whether he may have received help take on
new meaning in light of the possibility that the October 22 events may have been
Managed Terrorism. Of the various experts who appeared on Canadian
television in the days after the event offering analysis of the lone wolf
phenomenon, most missed a central point. The great majority of so-called lone
wolf Muslim terrorists in the United States active since 9/11 were not lone wolves
at all. They received ample assistance from a sophisticated, well-funded
organization, namely the FBI.
Is there a precedent for Canadian security services supplying functional weapons
to Managed Terrorists? Do they not first disable these weapons? Supplying
disabled weapons is certainly the usual procedure in Canada, as it is in the
United States. The handgun associated with the Toronto 18 was functional, but
I do not know if it was ever out of the control of the police mole. However, even if
giving a Managed Terrorist a functional and loaded weapon would have been an
unprecedented action in Canada on October 22, 2014, the worrisome possibility
remains that the practice of allowing or creating live terrorism may have
migrated northward from Canadas close ally. United States security services
have been involved in operations that used real weapons and that went live.
So, if US security services are now playing crucial roles in Canadian cases of
Managed Terrorism (and they certainly did in the Via Rail case), what are we to
think of the October 22, 2014, event? We know US security services were, at the
very least, kept well informed on October 22much better informed that
Canadian Members of Parliament. Were US agencies more deeply involved than
this?

48

Zehaf-Bibeau (bottom), Mufid Elfgeeh (upper left), John Nuttall (upper right)
Credit: RCMP and Monroe County Sheriff's Office

Was Michael Zehaf-Bibeau a Managed Terrorist like American Mufid Elfgeeh and
Canadian John Nuttall? Only a serious inquiry could answer this question, and
we have not had one.

49

DOES CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY ENCOURAGE DOMESTIC

TERRORISM?
This report has thus far ignored foreign policy, but no discussion of the October
22 events can completely exclude the topic. Foreign policy does not exist in its
own silo. Foreign policies encourage particular kinds of responses. A warlike
policy will provoke a warlike response from those who feel connected to victims
of the policy.
Some will say that to consider changing foreign policy after events like those in
October 2014 is to give in to terrorism. But any evaluation of a governments
foreign policy should include a consideration of the responses it is provoking and
whether these are desirable responses. Are the events of October 2014
desirable responses? The question is important regardless of what interpretation
of these events we adopt.
Recent Western policy toward Muslims has been, in my view, extraordinarily
violent and manipulative, and it is not surprising that it generates revenge
fantasies. Such fantasies are relevant no matter which category of terrorism or
pseudo-terrorism fits the case. If the October 22 event was an instance of
Managed Terrorism, revenge fantasies may still have played a part. Outrage and
resentment toward Western foreign policy is an important component of this
model. Nuttall, accused of the 2013 Canada Day bombing attempt in BC, has
been caught on tape speaking about the injustice of Canadas presence in
Afghanistan. Similar resentments have been expressed by members of other
Managed Terrorists in Canada and in the United States.
Susan Bibeau said her son was angered by what he called the thousands of
Iraqis killed by Western forces.163 Actually, there have been more than one
million excess deaths among Iraqis since the 2003 invasion led by the United
States,164 and if calculations include Western actions since 1990 the figure is
several times higher.165
There are hard truths that the events of October 22 should encourage Canadians
to face. In his actions and in his video statement Zehaf-Bibeau showed his desire
to be a warrior giving his life in response to violence in the Middle East initiated
by Western countries. If we deny Zehaf-Bibeaus claim to be a warrior and insist
that he was a criminalthis is the approach I adopt in this reportwe must be
willing to do the same in the international arena. We must say that the Canadian
governments closest ally in the War on Terror, the government of the United
States, acted as a criminal, not a warrior, when it invaded and destroyed Iraq
when it knowingly caused the deaths of a huge number of civilians innocent of
any crime. We must be equally insistent that the government of Israel, invited to
rejoice in the killing of Zehaf-Bibeau and repeatedly offered moral cover by Prime

50

Minister Harper, has acted as a criminal and not as a warrior in its devastating
attacks on Gaza.166
If we are not willing to be consistent, our moral outrage over the attacks of
October 22, 2014, will ring hollow.

51

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: THE NEED FOR A PUBLIC

INQUIRY
Questions
Here are thirty-four questions that have been raised in this report:
1. When and by whom was the FBI first informed of the perpetrators name?
2. How did Zehaf-Bibeau acquire his rifle, bullets, and knife?
3. What is the evidence supporting the RCMP claim that the knife wielded by
Zehaf-Bibeau had been stored at his aunts house?
4. Are there reports of a theft of a Model 94 rifle, or is there a list of people
suspected of providing it to Zehaf-Bibeau?
5. Is the RCMP ready to share with the public its detailed evidence with
respect to Zehaf-Bibeaus finances?
6. In which sector of the oil patch in Alberta did Zehaf-Bibeau work and with
whom did he work?
7. Why did Zehaf-Bibeau buy a car knowing he would have to drive it for over
three hours without plates, thereby putting his plan at risk?
8. Is the RCMP ready to share with the public its hypothesis about ZehafBibeaus true intentions for his car?
9. Why have we been kept in the dark about the origin, chain of custody and
dissemination of the iconic photograph of the perpetrator?
10. Did Zehaf-Bibeau have help on October 22?
11. Who was the second man at the War Memorial referred to by Scott
Walsh and why did he apparently flee the scene?
12. How did police arrive promptly (by October 23) at the conclusion that
Zehaf-Bibeau had been acting alone on October 22?
13. Did Zehaf-Bibeau receive assistance in planning or preparing for his
attacks?
14. Is there any evidence that Zehaf-Bibeau intended to kill and terrorize
civilians?
15. Had Canadian security services been developing scenarios very similar to
the ones that unfolded on October 20 and 22 shortly before these events?
16. How precise were the advance warnings received by security services, as
to the nature, locations, and timing of attacks?
17. What was the information received that supported these warnings and
where did it come from?
18. How much did the four soldiers attacked on October 20 and 22 know
about the advance warnings and threat levels, and what measures had
been taken in light of these warnings to ensure their safety?
19. Would the two soldiers killed on October 20 and 22 still be alive if the
serious nature of the advance warnings had been explained to them?
20. Why did the RCMP lie to the Canadian public about the advance
warnings?

52

21. How many shots were fired at the War Memorial and who were the
targets?
22. How many bullets were in Zehaf-Bibeaus rifle when he entered Centre
Block?
23. Was Zehaf-Bibeau wearing body armour when he entered Centre Block?
24. Was the police killing of Zehaf-Bibeau necessary?
25. Were security or intelligence forces, Canadian or foreign, complicit in any
way or to any degree in the October 22 attacks by Zehaf-Bibeau?
26. Was Zehaf-Bibeau a terrorist and, if he was, what kind of terrorist was
he?
27. Why, if the BC provincial politicians and legislative security staff were well
briefed by the Canadian intelligence community, did police in Ottawa,
including the RCMP, get taken by surprise?
28. Why were the instructions of the Privy Council Office not followed on
Parliament Hill when legislatures elsewhere in the country were apparently
acting on the warnings?
29. Why does none of the four police reports released to the public, at least in
the redacted forms available to us, mention the ITAC and PCO warnings?
30. Was it true that the threat level at Parliament had not been raised in recent
years, as the RCMP Assistant Commissioner said on October 22, and if it
was not true why did he misinform the public?
31. How many shots were fired into Zehaf-Bibeau after he had collapsed?
32. Why were the officers in Centre Block on October 22, 2014, justified in
rejecting the guideline: shoot until the suspect falls?
33. Why did the government of Canada permit Kevin Vickers to take a trip to
Israel and be celebrated by that government three weeks after the
October 22 events, given that Vickers shooting of Zehaf-Bibeau was still
under investigation and given that Israel was simultaneously being
investigated for war crimes?
34. Why has the Canadian government dealt with poor security on Parliament
Hill by reducing the civil rights of all Canadian citizens?
Basic Facts
If there is so much we still do not know about this very important criminal and
political event in Canadian history, what important facts do we know with a
reasonable degree of certainty?
On October 22, 2014, a man entered the Centre Block of the Parliament
Buildings in Ottawa. He had just used a hunting rifle to kill a soldier at the nearby
War Memorial. This lever-action rifle, designed in 1894, appears to have held two
bullets at the time of the intruders entry into Centre Block. Before he died the
man, Michael Zehaf-Bibeau, fired three times (reloading once), while security
personnel fired at him fifty-six times with semi-automatic 9mm handguns. A
ricochet, apparently from one of the intruders shots, injured a guard slightly.
Zehaf-Bibeau, struck by thirty-one bullets, died at the scene less than two

53

minutes after entering Centre Block, having been shot repeatedly, after
collapsing, from a distance of less than two metres.
We also know that accounts given by journalists and authorities in the immediate
wake of the attacks often exaggerated the danger the perpetrator represented to
Parliament and underrepresented the effectiveness of the response by security
services.
Common sense has suggested all along that the safety of Parliament can most
effectively be achieved by improving security on Parliament Hill. There is nothing
in the four police reports, or in my own study, that challenges this position.
Michael Zehaf-Bibeau would not have been in a position to threaten Parliament if
a sound security system had been in place, which effectively connected the
various security agencies and institutions in the vicinity of Parliament Hill. The
police reports acknowledge this, and presumably the security system that has
been put in place since the attacks will prevent a repetition of the October 22,
2014, intrusion.
To reduce the rights and liberties of all Canadians on the basis of the October
events on Parliament Hill would be absurd, yet this is what has been done by the
government of Canada.
Could the killing of Corporal Cirillo at the War Memorial have been prevented if
Canadian security services had had more power? To put it differently, if the bills
passed subsequent to October 22 had been in place at the time would they have
prevented Corporal Cirillos death? We do not know. The police reports released
to the public are of no help because they avoid asking the relevant questions
about the events of October 22.
One measure that would have made the killing of the Canadian soldiers in
October of 2014 less likely is the proper sharing of the warnings received several
days before the violent events and the implementing of appropriate precautions.
This measure would have required no new legislation and would not have
reduced the civil rights of Canadians. Are there now measures in place to ensure
improvement? On this issue the police reports, unfortunately, are silent.
The present report raises the possibility that Canadian, and perhaps US, security
services may have been complicit in some way in Zehaf-Bibeaus October 22
attacks. Until this possibility is definitively excludedit has not been excluded by
any of the police reportsthere should be no question of handing more power
and resources to these agencies.
Recommendations
There should be a federal public inquiry into the violent events that took place in
Canada in October 2014. Although the Ottawa attacks of October 22, 2014,

54

should be at the centre of this inquiry, investigation of surrounding events,

including those of October 20 in Quebec, should be included. If the federal
government declines to establish such an inquiry, provincial public inquiries,
separate or joint, should be established in the affected provinces.

55

APPENDIX A: THE POLICE REPORTS

1. RCMP Security PostureParliament Hill, October 22, 2014: OPP Review &
Recommendations (Ontario Provincial Police, dated March 2015). 35 pp.
This report gives the results of a study conducted by the OPP at the request of
the RCMP. The task of the study was to examine the actions of RCMP officers
from the moment Michael ZEHAF-BIBEAU entered the grounds of Parliament Hill
to the moment he accessed Centre Block.
The report notes that the approach to the security and protection of Parliament
Hill is highly inadequate. Along with systemic failures, the discussion of which is
heavily redacted, the report touches delicately on the fact that Zehaf-Bibeau
drove his hijacked car past two RCMP vehicles on Parliament Hill, both of which
followed him but neither of which appears to have made an effort to intercept
him.
Elements of the RCMP Security Force were in position to interdict the armed
gunman prior to entering the Parliament Building but did not.
Strangely, the report then continues: This review is not critical of the officers
response and actions. Reading this prepares us for the extraordinarily
understated conclusion of the report: On October 22, 2014, the RCMP security
posture and response to an active shooter on Parliament Hill could have been
more effective (p. 29).
It is difficult for the reader to avoid the conclusion that the investigating police
agency, the OPP, was extremely reluctant to publicly criticize the police agency
whose actions it had been charged with investigating, the RCMP. This is not
reassuring to the public, which has been offered no other form of investigation
into the events of October 2014 and which has been made to pay the price for
security lapses with a serious loss of civil rights.
2. External Engagement and CoordinationParliament Hill Incident on October
22, 2014: After Action Review (Royal Canadian Mounted Police, National
Division Review Team, April 29, 2015). 20 pp.
This report, compiled by the RCMP, takes as its main objective:
to provide a factual account of key areas related to the response to this event
and to make recommendations where gaps or unacceptable levels of risks are
identified. It is also intended to provide lessons learned
Since the RCMP asked the OPP to carry out the review of RCMP actions inside
Centre Block, this report deals only with RCMP actions on Parliament Hill outside

56

the Parliament buildings. Most of the report is devoted to general statements

about organizational responsibilities and best practices.
This report is very heavily redacted and offers little detail about the events of
October 22, 2014. It makes twenty-four recommendations, all of which have been
deleted from the version offered to the public. For example, section 15 deals with
Interoperability of Communication Technology. We are told that it remains an
unresolved challenge that results in fragmented communications that impede
timely decision-making. But when it comes to the actual incident of October 22,
2014, the report at once retreats into secrecy: As an example, the initial 911 call
dispatched *****.
We have to turn to the OPPs report (RCMP Security Posture) to learn that past
reviews had already identified these communication difficulties and had made
clear recommendations, which the RCMP failed to implement.
3. October 22, 2014: House of Commons Incident Response SummaryReport
for Parliamentarians, Employees, and the Parliament Hill Community.
(Apparently prepared by the House of Commons Protective Service, dated June
3, 2015). 16 pp.
This report was called for by the Speaker of the House, who explains its purpose:
I asked that this report be compiled in order to provide assurances to
parliamentarians, employees and visitors that they will continue to be safe on
Parliament Hill.
The report describes all the reviews of the Parliament Hill incidents being
undertaken. Six are listed, including the four released to the public on June 3.
The report then briefly recounts the incidents in Ottawa on October 22, 2014,
which ended with the completion of the evacuation of Centre Block at 10:10 p.m.
Although the report is true to its central aim of reassuring those on Parliament
Hill, it lists sixteen areas of improvement in security, beginning with Improved
operational coordination between all security forces is required.
There are no redactions (deletions; excisions) in this report. The sixteen
recommendations for improvement are for the most part sensible and, if properly
implemented, ought to go a long way toward improving security on the Hill.
The only security decision about which many readers will have grave doubts is
the decision (adopted by House of Commons and the Senate on February 16
and 24, 2015) to give the RCMP the leading role in security on Parliament Hill.
This agency has not proven either its competence or its trustworthiness in
dealing with events of alleged terrorism.

57

4. Independent Investigation Into the Death of Michael Zehaf-Bibeau, October

22, 2014, Centre Block, Parliament Hill, Ottawa, Canada (Ontario Provincial
Police, no date). 43 pp.
This report is the most substantial of the four. It is, at 43 pages, the longest, but it
also contains by far the most evidence relating to the events of October 22, 2015.
All names of actors in the events in Centre Block are redacted (replaced with
rows of asterisks), which makes for difficult reading. In other respects, however,
the document has been given to the public intact.
To its credit, the report forgoes the use of the words terrorism and terrorist.
The stated task of this study was to conduct an independent investigation into
the shooting death of Michael ZEHAF-BIBEAU that occurred on October 22,
2014. The report concludes that the killing of Zehaf-Bibeau was justified.
This document distiguishes itself from the other three by giving the names of
major participants in its production. The Major Case Manager was Detective
Inspector Shawn Glassford; the Primary Investigator was Staff Sergeant Ted
Hurren; and the File Coordinator was Detective Constable Tracy Allan. We are
not told who actually wrote the report.

58

APPENDIX B: THE ICONIC PHOTOGRAPH

In the photograph below that began to circulate on the Internet on October 22,
2014, a male figure can be seen holding a rifle and wearing a dark overcoat. The
gunman has a kaffiyeh around his neck and has it arranged to cover the lower
half of his face.

The iconic photograph

This figure seems indistinguishable from Zehaf-Bibeau as caught in Parliament

Hill security videos, seen in the frame below:167

59

The Parliament Hill perpetrator as caught on a security camera

Did the photo capture Michael Zehaf-Bibeau at the War Memorial as was quickly
claimed? This was not clear. Details were difficult to discern and the means by
which this photograph had reached the public were troubling.
On October 22, the National Post had carried a story of the photo that seemed to
be stitched together from different and contradictory accounts. First, we were told
the photo had initially been posted on a French-language, pro-ISIS social media
account. The article said the photograph had been posted early Tuesday
afternoon, which would have been October 21, the day before the Ottawa
shooting.168
But if the photo had been posted on Tuesday, when and where was it originally
taken? Surely not at the War Memorial. Rather, the photo would presumably
have been staged (to use a term later employed by the Post) somewhere else.
However, further on in the same October 22 article we were told that the photo
had been taken at the site of the National War Memorial shooting and that it
had been taken by a tourist. To add to the confusion, the grainy character of the
photo was explained by suggesting that the image . . . was apparently snapped
from a TV screen using a cell phone.
How were we to make sense of these statements? Did the tourist at the War
Memorial take a still photo on October 22, which was then shown on TV
somewhere, from which it was photographed with a cell phone, after which it was
posted on a pro-ISIS site on October 21? This could happen only in science
fiction. And even if we took the October 21 date to be a simple mistake we were
still left in confusion. When and where on October 22 had this still photo been

60

shown on television? It was shown on TV only after it was becoming iconic and
was already grainy.
On the following day, October 23, Postmedia News revised the story
substantially.169 No direct mention was made of the earlier claim that the photo
had been posted on the Internet on October 21. However, the author of the
October 23 article, S. Yogaretnam, dismissed that account indirectly by stating
that many in the media had initially assumed the photo had been staged jihadi
propaganda but that it had now become clear that a tourist took the photo on
October 22 at the War Memorial. She had decided in favour of one of the two
contradictory stories in the earlier Post account. In support of this version
Yogaretnam said, Hidden in plain sight in the photo is the concrete strength of
the National War Memorial. The photo, we were now told, was taken by a
tourist as the gunman embarked on his shooting spree, coming around the west
side of the monument from the rear.
But it was not obvious that this photo showed the concrete strength of the
National War Memorial. It certainly did not show the west side of the War
Memorial, as anyone familiar with the War Memorial would have been able to
attest. The west side has a series of joins, stains and inscriptions that would have
shown up in the photo. If the War Memorial appeared in the background it would
have to be the front where the guards were posted, the south side, underneath
the inscription, 1914-1918.

61

Front (south side) of war memorial, apparently just moments before the shooting on October 22,
170
2014: Cirillo (left) and Stevenson (right)

The mysteries continued. Yogaretnam next told us that the Ottawa police had
seized the camera of the tourist who took the photo and that an Ottawa police
officer took a picture of that picture with a cell phone. (She pointed to what she
called the telling rectangular zoom feature of the Blackberry operating system in
the lower right corner of the photo.) The officer then distributed this reproduced
and inferior (grainy) photo to colleagues in the Ottawa police department.
Somehow, this reproduction then was transmitted to, and released by, police
outside Canada. As for ISIS, Yogaretnam now explained that after the photo had
been released by police outside Canada, it was posted by a Twitter account
named @Armed Research that was, she said, Apparently run by a military
historian. This individual tweeted the photo at 4:23 p.m. on October 22, saying
It had been found on an ISIL-related account.
The Ottawa police were said to be trying to get to the bottom of the affair.
But this October 23 story was not much better than the one that had preceded it.
If an Ottawa police officer had seized the tourists camera, what would have been
the advantage of snapping an inferior copy of the original photo? Assuming the
original was digital, it would have been an easy matter to transmit it directly to

62

officers who might benefit from the image. The only satisfactory answer appears
to have been that the reproducing and disseminating of the photo via cell phone
were unauthorized actions. Also unauthorized, presumably, were the sending of
the image to foreign police and the leaking of the image by these foreign police.
Little wonder the Ottawa police were looking into the matter.
And we still had the problem of @Armed Research. Who was behind this Twitter
account and how was that party linked to foreign police? Moreover, why did the
@Armed Research party claim to have got the image from an ISIS account?
The next phase of the story, which appeared on the following day, October 24, in
Postmedia, appears to have won a fair degree of acceptance and was the
version that had made its way to the Wikipedia article on the events of October
22, 2014 by the summer of 2015.
By the time of the October 24 Postmedia version of the story (updated at 12:48
p.m. on that day) ISIS had retreated into the background and even @Armed
Research had been demoted.171 Now we were told that a French Canadian
journalist by the name of William Reymond was the key player. His blog of
October 23, to which we were now referred by Postmedia, showed him as an
earnest, well-intentioned journalist who, it now seemed, first released the iconic
photograph to the general public. He did so after doing his best to ascertain its
authenticity. He released it at 4:16 p.m. and @Armed Research simply retweeted it at 4:23 p.m., incorrectly ascribing it to a pro-ISIS site.172
In most other respects the story of the previous day remained in place in the
October 24 versionthe Ottawa police seizing the camera, the cell phone
reproduction, and so on.
But the version of the story in which Mr. Reymond played a key role was the
most profoundly dark of all. According to this version:

A person of unknown name snapped a photo of the perpetrator at the War

Memorial.
A person of unknown name briefly posted the photo on the Ottawa police
website.
A person of unknown name almost immediately removed the photo from
the website.
A person of unknown name, who had grabbed the briefly posted photo
from the Ottawa police website, sent the image to Mr. Reymond.
A person of unknown name assured Reymond that the face in the iconic
photo may have been the face of Zehaf-Bibeau.
Reymond received further confirmation of the authenticity of the photo
through other evidence (some of which we now know to be faulty).
Reymond then posted the iconic photo on his website.

63

The anonymous party at @Armed Research re-tweeted the photo and

mysteriously ascribed it to a pro-ISIS site.
Other sites and media organizations sent the photo around the world.

Although Reymond assured us he posted the photo before @Armed Research,

not everyone accepted this. Some said @Armed Research posted it well before
Reymond. Moreover, no one appeared to want to discuss the initial claim that the
image first appeared on October 21.
Was there eyewitness evidence confirming that a photo of this sort had been
taken at the War Memorial? Yes, there was at least one relevant eyewitness. In
an interview carried by the Ottawa Sun, Raivo Nommik, who was near the War
Memorial when the shooting took place, said that one of the tourists showed him
a photograph directly after the incident.173 Nommik said he could not identify the
guy who took the picture but he could remember the camera (I know his
camera) and that it was a Canon 6D or a 7D camera. Nommik confirmed that
the picture gave a perfect description and showed the figure the way Nommik
had seen hima bandana pulled up to his nose, a tanned complexion, and so
on.
Did the police know who the guy was who took the picture? Why were we still
completely in the dark about the identity of this tourist? Had the tourist taken
other pictures and, if so, where were they?
Finally, on October 2, 2015, almost a year after the shootings, the Ottawa Citizen
announced that it had tracked down a French tourist responsible for the photo.
We were given for the first time the full photograph from which the iconic image
had been extracted. And we were also given access to several more
photographs, apparently taken by the same individual only seconds before and
after the iconic photograph. These include what is allegedly the last photograph
ever taken of Corporal Cirillo as well a second photograph of Zehaf-Bibeau. This
second photo was apparently taken two seconds prior to the iconic photo, and in
it Zehaf-Bibeau has just come around the corner of the War Memorials west side
and has made it to the front (south) of the War Memorial. In this new photo
Zehaf-Bibeau is pointing his rifle and has either just fired or is about to fire his
weaponpresumably at Corporal Cirillo, who is, however, not in the picture.
These extraordinary revelations helped tie up several loose ends. Here are three
points the Citizens account allows us to affirm:
1. The iconic photograph was, indeed, taken at the War Memorial.
2. The part of the War Memorial that served as a backdrop was, as predicted, the
south side, not the west side.

64

3. The photograph was taken at the time of the shooting on the morning of
October 22, 2014. Although we do not actually see Corporal Cirillo and ZehafBibeau in the same frame, it makes sense that the French tourist was the guy
Raivo Nommik referred to as having taken an excellent picture of the perpetrator.
Several other claims made by the French tourist as reported in the Citizens
article do not add to our knowledge but do corroborate other sources. For
example, the French tourist was reported as saying he saw the perpetrator shoot
not only at Cirillo but also at the second honour guard (Branden Stevenson). He
also said the perpetrator, after shooting Cirillo, raised his rifle and yelled This is
for Iraq before running away. Both claims are likely to be true, as noted
elsewhere in this report.
But the Citizens October 2, 2015 article left several problems unsolved.
1. The identity of the eyewitness was not revealed in the Citizens article. The
man, we were told, did not wish his last name to be published. The Citizen
referred to him Jean Paul. Although the witness may have had good reasons
for wanting to remain anonymous, this anonymity radically decreased the value
of his evidence for civil society.
2. The process whereby the photograph taken by police ended up going around
the world in a cropped and fuzzy form was still not fully explained to us.
According to the Citizen, Jean Paul immediately contacted police at the scene
and told them about his photographs. He was taken to police headquarters on
Elgin Street in Ottawa where he and his companions were interviewed by four
police officers. He said to the Ottawa Citizen: We swore on the Bible that we
were telling the truth, nothing but the truth.
The Citizen said of the sequence of events following these interviews:
Police returned the camera to him but not before retrieving the images, one
of which was forwarded to the entire police email distribution list.
It is believed that several Ottawa police employees forwarded a zoomed-in
picture of the gunman to civilian email addresses.
The three police employees said to have forwarded the email to civilian email
addresses were, according to the Ottawa police, civilians, not officers. These
civilians were, we were told, given minor reprimands.
But the Citizen also reported, rather confusingly, that the leak of the photo onto
the Internet is believed to have originated from law enforcement sources, but its
not clear whether it was Ottawa police, OPP, RCMP or one of the other forces in
Canada or the United States who had access to the photograph that started the
chain that led to it being posted online.

65

3. We were given no details of the Citizens sleuthing. Why did it take almost a
year to track down the French tourist?
4. We were not told why the police repressed the photosthe original photo from
which the iconic image had been extracted as well as the other relevant
photographs for almost a year. These photographs were, after all, of direct
relevance to the case. There is no reference to them in the Independent
Investigation.
5. The Citizens journalist, Shaamini Yogaretnam, who had written previously
about the photograph, said on October 2, 2015 that the famous image was
brought to wide public attention by a pro-ISIL Twitter account after it had
allegedly already appeared in what Internet sleuths claimed was a tweet directed
to the Ottawa Police Services official account. She continued: The Citizen has
never verified the existence of that tweet to the police account. Many assumed,
in those early moments, that a supporter of Zehaf-Bibeau, perhaps even an
accomplice, had taken the picture and released it to the Internet using tactics
familiar to jihadi sympathizers.
It was peculiar to find Ms. Yogaretnam reverting to the claim that the image was
brought to wide public attention by a pro-ISIL Twitter account. This claim had
been quietly dropped several days after October 22, 2014. Ms. Yogaretnam did
not explain why she decided to resurrect it.
Neither William Reymond nor @Armed Research made an appearance in Ms.
Yogaretnams October 2, 2015 article.
At the time of the completion of the present report (directly after the October 2,
2015, revelations by the Ottawa Citizen), serious problems in connection this
photograph obviously remained.

66

APPENDIX C: TRANSCRIPT OF ZEHAF-BIBEAU VIDEO

The following is an apparently complete transcript of Zehaf-Bibeaus video
statement. The video statement was initially redacted by the RCMP.174 In May
2015 the RCMP released the initially removed eighteen seconds, which are given
in square brackets below. The English translation of the Arabic spoken by ZehafBibeau in these eighteen seconds is that provided by the Toronto Star.175
[In Arabic: In the name of Allah the most gracious and the most merciful. All
praises to Allah, the Lord of the universe. We seek his help and ask for his
forgiveness. Lord, open for me my chest, ease my task for me and remove the
impediment from my speech. In the name of Allah the most gracious and the
most merciful.]
"To those who are involved and listen to this movie, this is in retaliation for
Afghanistan and because Harper wants to send his troops to Iraq.
So we are retaliating, the Mujahedin of this world. Canadas officially become one
of our enemies by fighting and bombing us and creating a lot of terror in our
countries and killing us and killing our innocents. So, just aiming to hit some
soldiers just to show that youre not even safe in your own land, and you gotta be
careful.
So, may Allah accept from us. Its a disgrace you guys have forgotten God and
have you let every indecency and things running your land. We dont, we dont go
for this. We are good people, righteous people, believers of God and believing
his law and his Prophets, peace be upon them all. Thats my message to all of
you in this, Inshallah, well not cease until you guys decide to be a peaceful
country and stay to your own and I-, and stop going to other countries and stop
occupying and killing the righteous of us who are trying to bring back religious
law in our countries.
Thank you.
[In Arabic: Lord accept from me and peace be upon you and upon the
Mujahedin. May Allah curse you!!]

67

APPENDIX D: ANALYSIS OF ZEHAF-BIBEAU VIDEO176

(i) Zehaf-Bibeau is sitting in a car, apparently in the front seat, as he records his
message. He appears to be filming the brief statement while holding his
cellphonethe camera jiggles at times. He has a beard but not the mustache he
wears in his most well-known mug shot. His hair is dark, long and curling. He is
wearing a white shirt with a pattern, open at the throat. There is dark clothing
beyond the shirt, probably his long coat. We cannot see the kaffiyeh or the
weapons he was to carry during his actions.
(ii) As he begins speaking in Arabic he looks briefly out the window of his car. We
cannot tell what he is looking at.
(iii) At times he looks directly into the camera; at other times he looks elsewhere,
especially down and to the right as if consulting a text. (If he was consulting a
text, has it been found?)
(iv) Although this is for the most part a passionless performance, he seems to
display anger or disgust twice: When talking about the bombing and killing in
Muslim lands by Western forces and when talking about the way people commit
indecencies in Canada and have forgotten God. There are also brief indications
of piety. For example, he closes his eyes briefly when he says peace be upon
them, referring to Gods Prophets, and he lifts his eyes in the last seconds of his
recording as if looking heavenwards.
(v) Zehaf-Bibeau speaks of Canada and of Mr. Harper by name, and he claims
his actions are in retaliation for Canadian actions in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Although he refers to himself as an individual twice (I and my message), he
more often speaks on behalf of a collective subject (We . . . the Mujahadin of
this world).
(vi) These is no mention of particular groups such as al-Qaeda or ISIL. His
speech is a curious marriage of discourse befitting a group such as the Taliban
(he considers the West decadent and wants to restore religious law in Muslim
countries) and of folksy appeal to Canadians in informal Canadian dialect (you
guys).
(vii) There is no indication that he wants to champion Islamic law in Canada. He
speaks not of establishing but of restoring religious law, and the countries in
which he wants to see it restored are other countries such as those Canada has
been attacking.
(viii) His message (the English portion) begins with a reference to those who are
involved and who listen to this movie. What he means by involved is not
clear.
(ix) The video is consistent with the idea that he was sacrificing himself on
October 22 and that his act was a martyrdom operation: May Allah accept from
us. We cannot tell whether the us refers to himself or to a group that helped
him plan or carry out the actions of October 22.
(x) Like most people involved in religiously supported violence he seems to place
himself within the context of a war that is simultaneously cosmic and concrete,

68

understanding himself as a righteous warrior (the Mujahidin are good people,

righteous people, believers of God) who is bravely retaliating, and attempting to
stop aggression carried out against innocents and believers who have done
nothing wrong.177
(xi) He does not seem to see himself as attacking civilians. He states that his aim
is to hit some soldiers. This fits with his view of himself as a warrior, not a
terrorist.
(xii) There is no reference to Parliament and no explanation of his aims in
Parliament.
(xiii) It is not clear if he wishes to demonstrate that all Canadians are unsafe in
their own country or whether the demonstration is supposed to apply only to
soldiers (just aiming to hit some soldiers just to show that youre not even safe in
your own land, and you gotta be careful.)

69

APPENDIX E: PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE TERRORISM WARNING178

70

APPENDIX F: WAS ZEHAF-BIBEAU WEARING BODY ARMOUR?

The Independent Investigation does not mention Zehaf-Bibeau wearing body
armour, and it would have become evident very rapidly after his death if he had
been wearing it. What does the publicly available evidence suggest?
Parliament Hill reporter Cormac MacSweeney was in Centre Block when the
perpetrator entered. MacSweeney fled as the shooting began. Apparently a
witness told MacSweeney he saw a man wearing body armour walk through the
front doors of Parliament Hill with what appeared to be a long gun. MacSweeney
tweeted at the time: Hearing the gunman who entered Parliament Hill was
wearing body armour.179 This is intriguing, but it is hearsay.
MacSweeneys is not the only reference, however, to the perpetrator wearing
body armour. Terence Young, Conservative Member of Parliament for Oakville,
had been in caucus with his party members while the shootings occurred outside
the room. Three days later he sent a letter to his constituents (still posted on his
website on August 25, 2015), in which he said,
We found out later the terrorist was hit by many bullets, but had a bullet-proof
vest on. He was not killed until the Sergeant-at-Arms rolled over towards him and
shot him in the head.180
Mr. Young claims to have been passing on accurate information to his
constituents. Was it accurate?
On October 27, CBC reported that when RCMP Commissioner Paulson was
questioned on this matter he indicated that he doesnt believe Zehaf-Bibeau was
wearing body armour during Wednesdays attack.181 This is a very strange
answer. The perpetrator either was or was not wearing body armour. The truth
would have been known very quickly to anyone examining his body. Yet several
days after the event the RCMP Commissioner still was not sure?
RCMP officer Barrett, who was directly involved in the killing of Zehaf-Bibeau,
was present after the killing when Zehaf-Bibeaus body was handled by police
(pulse taken, knife cut from wrist, a check done for explosives, head propped up
while photograph was takensee the Independent Inquiry). The National Post
reported on June 2, 2015, that Barrett spent the rest of the day with the NDP
caucus . . .Tom Mulcair, the NDP leader, asked if the gunman was wearing body
armour and was told it wasnt clear but that he didnt go down until he was shot in
the head.182 Again, this an odd response. Would not those handling ZehafBibeaus body know quickly whether or not he was wearing body armour?
What about the fact that Zehaf-Bibeau remained relatively unscathed during the
first volley? Is this not suggestive of his wearing body armour? In this case the

71

wounds he did receive on his body would presumably have to be explained by

penetrating shots at close range, mainly during the second volley.
Kevin Vickers, according to the Independent Investigation, fired 15 shots at
Zehaf-Bibeau at very close range. We are not told how many of these shots hit
the target but, given the range, it seems safe to assume it would have been at
least ten. RCMP officer Barrett fired 14 (or 15) times at close range and believes
that every one of his shots hit Zehaf-Bibeau. If these roughly 25 successful shots
caused wounds in Zehaf-Bibeau, this would mean that only 6 of the
approximately 27 shots fired during the first volley caused bullet wounds. (Recall
that 56 shots were fired at Zehaf-Bibeau and he had 31 bullet wounds.)
But the shots fired at Zehaf-Bibeau during the first volley were fired under stress
and at a moving target at variable range. Research based on previous incidents
reveals that police officers often miss their target with handguns at any distance
other than very close range, and they are even more apt to miss when they are
part of a group-firing, as they were in Centre Block.183 The ratio of misses to hits
in the first volley in Centre Block is not, apparently, unusual.
The body armour hypothesis cannot, therefore, get off the ground without direct
evidence, either physical or eyewitness.
The issue is important. Just as it would have been difficult for a homeless man
with a criminal record to acquire a rifle in Canada, it would have been difficult to
acquire body armour. Although each province in Canada has its own regulations
regarding body armour, the purchase of body armour tends to be discouraged by
police. Not only would the presence of body armour indicate serious forethought
and advance planning, it would also raise the question as to whether the
perpetrator had been assisted in equipping himself.

72

NOTES
1

RCMP Security PostureParliament Hill, October 22, 2014: OPP Review &
Recommendations (Ontario Provincial Police, March 2015), 12.
2
Josh Wingrove, RCMP Hesitant to Release Gunman Zehaf-Bibeaus Video
Manifesto, The Globe and Mail, December 1, 2014. Jim Bronskill, Blaney cites
cocktail of mental illness, drugs, extremism in soldiers killing. Canadian Press,
November 4, 2014. Amy MacPherson, Government Passes Anti-Constitutional
Surveillance Law During Ottawa Shooting. FreeThePressCanada, October 23, 2014.
3
Canadian PM: Ottawa War Memorial, Parliament Shootings Were Terrorism (CBS,
October 22, 2014).
4
Attack in Ottawa (CBC TV, October 25, 2014).
5
Dario Di Meo, Ottawa Shooting: Evidence of a Staged False Flag Attack, Memory
Hole, October 31, 2014, http://memoryholeblog.com/2014/10/31/ottawa-shootingevidence-of-a-staged-false-flag-attack/.
6
Multiple Shootings on Parliament Hill: Ottawa Shooter Identified--Video of Suspect
and Car Michael Zehaf-Bibeau (CBC, October 22, 2014).
7
Ian Mulgrew, Ian Mulgrew: Is This the Face of Homegrown Terrorism?, Vancouver
Sun, February 10, 2015.
8
Ian Mulgrew, Ian Mulgrew: Bomb Plot Couple Needed Addiction Counselling, Not
Terror Prosecution, Vancouver Sun, March 9, 2015.
9
Breaking News (CBC TV, October 22, 2014).
10
CBC Radio One Toronto (CBC, October 22, 2014).
11
Ibid.
12
Amy MacPherson, Government Passes Anti-Constitutional Surveillance Law During
Ottawa Shooting, FreeThePressCanada, October 23, 2014.
13
Ibid.
14
Shooting in Ottawa Shuts Down Parliament; Canadian Parliament on Lockdown
(CNN, October 22, 2014).
15
CBC Radio One Toronto.
16
Canadian PM: Ottawa War Memorial, Parliament Shootings Were Terrorism (CBS,
October 22, 2014).
17
Ibid. Also, Paul Farrell, Michael Zehaf-Bibeau: 5 Fast Facts You Need to Know.
Heavy.com, October 2223, 2014.
18
Paul Farrell, Michael Zehaf-Bibeau: 5 Fast Facts You Need to Know, Heavy.com,
October 22, 2014.
19
Meghan Hurley and Glen McGregor, Man IDd as Gunman Had Lived in Montreal,
Vancouver and Aylmer, Ottawa Citizen, October 23, 2014; Farrell, Michael ZehafBibeau: 5 Fast Facts You Need to Know.
20
Michael Friscolanti, Uncovering a Killer: Addict, Drifter, Walking Contradiction,
Macleans, October 30, 2014.
21
Ibid.
22
Macleans was quick off the mark with a relatively long biographical piece. Ibid.
23
Susan Bibeaus Letter to Postmedia News, October 25, 2014.

73

24

Hurley and McGregor, Man IDd as Gunman Had Lived in Montreal, Vancouver and
Aylmer.
25
Canadian PM: Ottawa War Memorial, Parliament Shootings Were Terrorism,
October 22, 2014; Farrell, Michael Zehaf-Bibeau: 5 Fast Facts You Need to Know;
Tristin Hopper and Meghan Hurley, Michael Zehaf-Bibeau, the Accused Ottawa
Gunman: A Quebec Man with a Criminal Past, Postmedia News, October 22, 2014.
26
Islamic State Releases Picture of Algerian-Canadian Gunman Michael Abdul ZehafBibeau, behind Ottawa Attack, The Muslim Issue, October 22, 2014.
27
CBC News Now with Ian Hanomansing (CBC TV, October 22, 2014); Ottawa
Shooting Suspect Michael Zehaf-Bibeau Had Very Developed Criminality, (CTV,
October 23, 2014).
28
Friscolanti, Uncovering a Killer: Addict, Drifter, Walking Contradiction.
29
Farrell, Michael Zehaf-Bibeau: 5 Fast Facts You Need to Know.
30
Ottawa Shooting Suspect Michael Zehaf-Bibeau Had Very Developed Criminality.
31
2014 Shootings at Parliament Hill, Ottawa, Wikipedia, accessed October 27, 2014.
32
Thomas Frank, The Wrecking Crew: How a Gang of Right-Wing Con Men Destroyed
Washington and Made a Killing, Harpers Magazine, August 2008.
33
See Wikipedia, Winchester rifle, accessed August 20, 2015.
34
CBC News Now with Ian Hanomansing.
35
Appendix C. And Susan Bibeaus Letter to Postmedia News.
36
Martin Patriquin, Martin Couture-Rouleau: A Homegrown Madman, Macleans,
October 22, 2014.
37
MacPherson, Government Passes Anti-Constitutional Surveillance Law During
Ottawa Shooting.
38
Maxime Deland, Radicalized Quebecer Shot Dead after Running down 2 Soldiers in
Suspected Terrorist Attack, QMI Agency, October 21, 2014.
39
The National (CBC TV, October 22, 2014).
40
Ibid.
41
Michael Harris, The Final Front: Veterans Versus Harper in 2015, iPOLITICS,
November 13, 2014, http://www.ipolitics.ca/2014/11/13/the-final-front-veterans-versusharper-in-2015/.Michael Harris, The Final Front: Veterans Versus Harper in 2015,
iPOLITICS, November 13, 2014, http://www.ipolitics.ca/2014/11/13/the-final-frontveterans-versus-harper-in-2015/.
42
Stewart Bell, Michael Zehaf-Bibeau Made Video That Suggests Ottawa Shooting
Driven by Ideological, Political Motives: RCMP, National Post, October 26, 2014.
43
Robert, Commissioner Paulsons Appearance at SECU on the Zehaf-Bibeau Video
(Royal Canadian Mounted Police, March 6, 2015).
44
David Pugliese, Parliament Hill Gunmans Knife Taken from Mount Tremblant
Property, Origin of Gun Still Unknown, Ottawa Citizen, October 27, 2014.
45
Bell, Michael Zehaf-Bibeau Made Video That Suggests Ottawa Shooting Driven by
Ideological, Political Motives: RCMP; The National: The Car and the Gun (CBC
TV, October 24, 2014).
46
The National: The Car and the Gun.
47
Bell, Michael Zehaf-Bibeau Made Video That Suggests Ottawa Shooting Driven by
Ideological, Political Motives: RCMP.

74

48

Commissioner Paulsons Appearance at SECU on the Zehaf-Bibeau Video.

Ottawa Shooting Suspect Michael Zehaf-Bibeau Had Very Developed Criminality.
50
Glen McGregor, Police Harvest Video of Zehaf-Bibeau from Ottawa Mall, Ottawa
Citizen, October 27, 2014.
51
Commissioner Paulsons Appearance at SECU on the Zehaf-Bibeau Video.
52
Geoffrey Morgan, How Did Ottawa Shooter Michael Zehaf-Bibeau Get Work in the
Oil Patch? Blame the Labour Crunch, Financial Post, October 28, 2014.
53
CBC News Now with Ian Hanomansing; 2014 Shootings at Parliament Hill,
Ottawa, Wikipedia, accessed October 27, 2014; The National (CBC TV, October 23,
2014).
54
Daniel Schwartz, Ottawa Shooting: How Events Unfolded, (CBC News, October 22,
2014).
55
Schwartz, Ottawa Shooting: How Events Unfolded.
56
Zachary Sticher, Rideau Centre Mall Shooting: Police Say Shots Fired at Third
Location in Ottawa, Then Recant Report, Epoch Times, October 22, 2014.
57
Extended: Chaos at the Rideau Centre (CTV Ottawa, October 22, 2014).
58
Breaking News: Canadian Soldier Killed, at Least 3 Others Wounded (CNN,
October, 2231).
59
Sticher, Rideau Centre Mall Shooting: Police Say Shots Fired at Third Location in
Ottawa, Then Recant Report.
60
Ibid.
61
Ibid.
62
CBC News Now with Ian Hanomansing.
63
CTV National News with Lisa LaFlamme (CTV, October 22, 2014).
64
CBC News Now with Ian Hanomansing.
65
CBC Radio One Toronto.
66
Tonda MacCharles, Michelle Shephard, and Alex Boutilier, No Connection between
Ottawa Gunman and Quebec Attacker, RCMP Say, Toronto Star, October 23, 2014.
67
CBC Radio One Toronto.
68
Video: Scott Walsh: Saw Armed Man Hijack Car at Gunpoint, Ottawa Citizen,
October 23, 2014.
69
David Bruser, Alleged Gunman Michael Zehaf-Bibeau Had Long List of Run-Ins
with the Law, Toronto Star, October 23, 2014. The Walsh video interview is on
Thestar.com.
70
Sue Allan et al, Eyewitness Accounts of the Ottawa Shootings, Macleans, October
29, 2014.
71
Breaking News: Canadian Soldier Killed, at Least 3 Others Wounded.
72
Kady OMalley, Michael Zehaf-Bibeau Video to Be Released Someday, RCMPs
Paulson Hope, CBC News, October 27, 2014.
73
Wingrove, RCMP Hesitant to Release Gunman Zehaf-Bibeaus Video Manifesto.
74
Commissioner Paulsons Appearance at SECU on the Zehaf-Bibeau Video.
75
Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious
Violence (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 2000).
76
RCMP Commissioner Bob Paulson on the Michael Zehaf-Bibeau Video (CBC
Radio, March 7, 2015).
49

75

77

Allan et al, Eyewitness Accounts of the Ottawa Shootings; Sonja Puzic, Canada
Will Never Be Intimidated, Harper Says after Shootings in Ottawa (CTV, October 22,
2014).
78
Gunman Yelled For Iraq: Ottawa Shooting Eyewitness (CBC, October 23, 2014).
79
Evan Dyer, Ottawa Shooting: Where Did Michael Zehaf-Bibeau Get His Gun?, CBC
News, October 24, 2014; The Day after: Shooter Was Not on RCMP Watch List,
Commissioner Says, Ottawa Citizen, October 23, 2014; Jorge Barrera, The RCMP
Should Allow OPP to Expand Independent Probe of Parliament Hill Attack: NDP MP,
APTN National News, October 29, 2014.
80
Gunman Yelled For Iraq: Ottawa Shooting Eyewitness; CBC News Now with Ian
Hanomansing; CBC Radio One Toronto; Alleged Ottawa Shooter Apparently Had
Criminal Past in Quebec; Was Repeatedly Brought in on Drug Charges, National Post,
October 22, 2014; Shooting in Ottawa Shuts Down Parliament; Canadian Parliament on
Lockdown; Schwartz, Ottawa Shooting: How Events Unfolded; Jon Willing,
Witnesses Recall Chaos on Parliament Hill, Ottawa Sun, October 22, 2014; Breaking
News on CBC News Network: Shooting in Ottawa (CBC TV, October 22, 2014);
Breaking News: Canadian Soldier Killed, at Least 3 Others Wounded.
81
CBC News Now with Ian Hanomansing; Cpl. Nathan Cirillos Best Friend Back
on Duty at Ottawa War Memorial, CBC Hamilton, November 3, 2014; Willing,
Witnesses Recall Chaos on Parliament Hill, October 22, 2014; Yogaretnam, McGregor,
and Maher, Shooter on the Warpath Hijacked Ministers Car to Reach Parliaments
Centre Block; Ottawa Shooter Caught on Video (CBC TV, October 24, 2014).
82
Shaamini Yogaretnam, The Face of Terror: Picture of Suspect Taken by Tourist,
Postmedia News, October 23, 2014.
83
CBC Radio One Toronto; John Ivison et al., Masked Gunman Killed after Canadian
Soldier, Cpl. Nathan Cirillo, Fatally Shot at National War Memorial, National Post,
October 22, 2014.
84
CBC Radio One Toronto.
85
Hill Security Video, Ottawa Citizen, October 23, 2014.
86
Schwartz, Ottawa Shooting: How Events Unfolded; CBC Radio One Toronto;
Allan et al, Eyewitness Accounts of the Ottawa Shootings.
87
Il a arm son fusil. (He cocked [racked] his rifle.) An eyewitness whose words
were caught on video on October 22, 2014. RAW: CBCs Parliament Hill shooting
footage. October 22, 2014, 23 minutes.
88
Dyer, Ottawa Shooting: Where Did Michael Zehaf-Bibeau Get His Gun?
89
CBC Camera Man on Parliament Hill Gunshots: Jean Brousseau Recounts Hearing
Shots Ring out and Pulling out His Camera to Record (CBC TV, October 23, 2014).
90
Josh Wingrove, Ottawa Shooter Toured Parliament before Attack, Official Says, The
Globe and Mail, November 14, 2014.
91
For eyewitness estimates see: CBC News Now with Ian Hanomansing; Ottawa
Shooting: Reconstructing the Centre Block Shootout (CBC TV, November 2, 2014);
Sarah-Joyce Battersby and Cormac MacSweeney, Soldier Gunned down near Parliament
Hill Identified as Hamilton Man. A more precise estimate can be achieved by matching
audio tracks found in the following: 680 News and The Canadian Press, October 22,

76

2014; and Ottawa Shooting: A Day of Chaos Leaves Soldier, Gunman Dead (CBC TV,
October 22, 2014).
92
Laura Payton, Ottawa Shooting: Reporter Josh Wingrove Caught Dramatic Scene on
Video, CBC News, October 22, 2014.
93
Dyer, Ottawa Shooting: Where Did Michael Zehaf-Bibeau Get His Gun?; The
National: The Car and the Gun.
94
CBC Radio One Toronto. (The point is made more than once in this broadcast.)
95
Independent Investigation Into the Death of Michael Zehaf-Bibeau, October 22, 2014,
Centre Block, Parliament Hill, Ottawa, Canada (Ontario Provincial Police, no date).
Although there are a couple of weak attempts in this report to suggest the perpetrator may
have shot four times, three is the number that is consistent with most eyewitness reports
and that is supported by the forensic evidence.
96
Jason Hanna and Dana Ford, Sources: Ottawa Gunman Had Ties to Jihadists, CNN,
October 23, 2014.
97
OMalley, Michael Zehaf-Bibeau Video to Be Released Someday, RCMPs Paulson
Hope.
98
The National, October 22, 2014.
99
Breaking News; CBC Radio One Toronto.
100
Breaking News.
101
Ibid.
102
Ibid.
103
The National, October 22, 2014.
104
Breaking News.
105
CBC Radio One Toronto.
106
Canadian PM: Ottawa War Memorial, Parliament Shootings Were Terrorism,
October 22, 2014.
107
Shooting in Ottawa Shuts Down Parliament; Canadian Parliament on Lockdown.
108
Breaking News.
109
Mahdi Nazemroaya, Canada and the War on Terror: What Happened in Ottawa on
October 22, 2014?, Global Research, October 25, 2014.
110
Jenni Sheppard, Ottawa Shooting: B.C. MLAs Were Warned of Possible Security
Threat, CBC News, British Columbia, October 22, 2014.
111
Michael Smyth, Smyth: B.C. Politicians Were Warned of Attack, so Why Was
Ottawa so Surprised? The Province, October 23, 2014.
112
B.C. Legislature Warned of Heightened Security Concerns from Ottawa Officials,
Ottawa Star, October 23, 2014.
113
Terry Milewski, Ottawa Shooting: Federal Security Chiefs Warned Days before
Attack: Alert from Privy Council Office Came 5 Days before Shooting on Parliament
Hill, (CBC News, November 24, 2014).
114
Ibid.
115
Ibid.
116
Ibid.
117
Ibid.
118
Josh Wingrove, Several Questions Unanswered Two Months after Centre Block
Shooting, The Globe and Mail, December 22, 2014.

77

119

Breaking News.
John Ivison, Who Fired the Fatal Shot That Killed Michael Zehaf-Bibeau?
Eyewitness Account Suggests It Wasnt Kevin Vickers, National Post, June 2, 2015.
121
Kevin Vickers Named Ambassador to Ireland: Sergeant-at-Arms of the House of
Commons Lauded for Confronting Shooter on Parliament Hill, (CBC News, January 8,
2015).
122
In Israel, Sergeant-at-Arms Vickers given Heros Welcome, The Globe and Mail
(Associated Press), November 12, 2014.
123
Report of the Detailed Findings of the Independent Commission of Inquiry
Established pursuant to Human Rights Council Resolution S-21/1 (United Nations
Human Rights Council, June 24, 2015), pp. 78, 89, 90, 96-97, 101102, 109110, 111,
118.
124
Kevin Vickers Named Ambassador to Ireland: Sergeant-at-Arms of the House of
Commons Lauded for Confronting Shooter on Parliament Hill.
125
Thomas Aveni and Duane Chickering, The Varley Inquiry: An Objective Analysis of
RCMP Policies and Procedures Salient to the In-Custody Death of Darren Varley (The
Police Policy Studies Council, April 2010).
126
Wingrove, Several Questions Unanswered Two Months after Centre Block
Shooting.
127
See also ibid.; Gilles Michaud, Assistant Commissioner Gilles Michaud Speaks on
the Release of the Reports on the October 22, 2014 Incident on Parliament Hill, June 3,
2015.
128
Commissioner Paulsons Appearance at SECU on the Zehaf-Bibeau Video.
129
Criminal Code, 83.01: Terrorism: Interpretation, n.d.
130
Sudha Setty, Whats in a Name? How Nations Define Terrorism Ten Years After
9/11, University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 33:1 (October 30, 2011).
131
Trevor Aaronson, The Terror Factory: Inside the FBIs Manufactured War on
Terrorism (Brooklyn, New York: Ig Publishing, 2013).
132
Ibid., 201.
133
Ibid., 15.
134
Ibid.
135
Ibid., 16.
136
Ibid., 32.
137
Ibid., 197.
138
Ibid., 61, 155ff.
139
Ibid., 151.
140
Ibid., 34.
141
Ibid., 2627.
142
Ibid., 15.
143
Ibid., 11.
144
Ibid., 30.
145
Ian Mulgrew, Ian Mulgrew: Confused, Exhausted Bomb Plotter Angered Undercover
Brother, Vancouver Sun, March 5, 2015.
146
Aaronson, The Terror Factory: Inside the FBIs Manufactured War on Terrorism, 43.
147
Ibid., 113114.
120

78

148

Michael Keefer, The Toronto 18 Frame-Up: Fraud and Fear-Mongering in the War
on Terror, Global Outlook, 2008.
149
Ian Mulgrew, Ian Mulgrew: Bomb Plot Couple Expected to Fly to Freedom,
Vancouver Sun, March 19, 2015.
150
Ibid.
151
Ian Mulgrew, Ian Mulgrew: Over Objections, Lawyer for Alleged Terrorists Sheds
Light on a Few Details, Vancouver Sun, March 23, 2015.
152
Ian Mulgrew, Ian Mulgrew: Accused Bomb Plotter Feared Being Taken out by
Undercover Officer, Vancouver Sun, March 16, 2015.
153
Ibid.
154
Laura Kane, B.C. Terror Suspect Initially Unsure about Targeting Legislature in
Attack, Court Hears, Canadian Press, March 12, 2015; Ian Mulgrew, Ian Mulgrew:
Confused, Exhausted Bomb Plotter Angered Undercover Brother, Vancouver Sun,
March 5, 2015; Ian Mulgrew, Ian Mulgrew: There Are Terrorists, and Then There
Are... Vancouver Sun, March 11, 2015; Mulgrew, Ian Mulgrew: Bomb Plot Couple
Expected to Fly to Freedom.
155
Via Rail Plot Trial: Raed Jaser, Chiheb Esseghaier Found Guilty on Several Terror
Charges, CBC News, March 20, 2015.
156
The National, October 23, 2014.
157
Rochester Man Indicted on Charges of Attempting to Provide Material Support to
ISIS, Attempting to Kill U.S. Soldiers, and Possession of Firearms and Silencers, FBI,
Buffalo Division, September 16, 2014.
158
Tony Cartalucci, Terronoia Theatre Presents: Staged ISIS Attacks, Land Destroyer
Report, September 18, 2014.
159
ANNEX TO APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE A: PRETEXTS TO JUSTIFY US
MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA (OPERATION NORTHWOODS, Pp. 137
Ff.), 1962,
http://www.maryferrell.org/mffweb/archive/viewer/showDoc.do?docId=1244&relPageId
=137.
160
Tony Cartalucci, Canadian Terror Wave: A Modern-Day Gladio, Global Research,
October 23, 2014.
161
The National, October 22, 2014.
162
CBC News Now with Ian Hanomansing; Ottawa Shooting: RCMP Takes over
Investigation, OPP to Probe Police Conduct, CBC News, October 25, 2014; ibid.;
Canadian PM: Ottawa War Memorial, Parliament Shootings Were Terrorism, October
22, 2014; Ottawa Shooters Mom Contradicts RCMP (CBC TV, October 26, 2014).
163
Susan Bibeaus Letter to Postmedia News.
164
IPPNW Germany, PSR, PGS, Body Count: Casualty Figures after 10 Years of the
War on Terror--Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan (IPPNW Germany, PSR, PGS, 2015).
165
Ahmed Nafeez, Unworthy Victims: Western Wars Have Killed Four Million
Muslims since 1990, Middle East Eye, April 8, 2015.
166
Michael Keefer, Hard Truths for Canada about Israel & Palestine (Toronto: Le
Tonnelier Media, 2015).
167
Hill Security Video.

79

168

Hopper and Hurley, Michael Zehaf-Bibeau, the Accused Ottawa Gunman: A Quebec
Man with a Criminal Past.
169
Shaamini Yogaretnam, The Face of Terror: Picture of Suspect Taken by Tourist,
Ottawa Citizen, October 23, 2014.
170
This photograph was tweeted by Evanem on October 22, 2014 with the
accompanying words: ok so we were on a tour at that war memorial in Ottawa a few
minutes ago, a few seconds later there was a shooting... See KHQ Wake Up Show,
October 23, morning. (KHQ-TV is the NBC affiliate for Spokane, Washington.)
171
First Photo of Ottawa Gunman Taken by Tourist Who Witnessed Shooting at
National War Memorial, Sources Say, National Post, October 24, 2014.
172
William Reymond, The Story Behind the Picture ISIS Never Tweeted, Huffington
Post, November 1, 2014.
173
Jon Willing, Witnesses Recall Chaos on Parliament Hill, Ottawa Sun, October 22,
2014. Nommiks interview can be seen on the video footage accompanying the article on
the www.ottawasun.com website.
174
Ottawa Shooting: Read Transcript of the Michael Zehaf-Bibeau Video, The Globe
and Mail, March 6, 2015.
175
Alex Boutilier and Bruce Smith, RCMP Release Withheld 18 Seconds of Michael
Zehaf-Bibeaus Cellphone Manifesto, Toronto Star, May 29, 2015.
176
The Zehaf-Bibeau video is from The Globe and Mail, March 6. It was carried on the
website www.globeandmail.com. The frame shown in the text has been plucked from that
video.
177
Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence.
178
Milewski, Ottawa Shooting: Federal Security Chiefs Warned Days before Attack:
Alert from Privy Council Office Came 5 Days before Shooting on Parliament Hill. The
PCO document accompanied this article and has been downloaded from the CBC
website.
179
Soldier Gunned down near Parliament Hill Identified as Hamilton Man (680 News,
October 22, 2014).
180
Terence Young, Inside the Causus Room During the Attack on Parliament, Terence
Young, M.P. Oakville, October 23, 2014. www.terenceyoung.com
181
OMalley, Michael Zehaf-Bibeau Video to Be Released Someday, RCMPs
Paulson Hope.
182
Ivison, Who Fired the Fatal Shot That Killed Michael Zehaf-Bibeau? Eyewitness
Account Suggests It Wasnt Kevin Vickers.
183
Thomas Aveni, Officer-Involved Shootings: What We Didnt Know Has Hurt US
(The Police Policy Studies Council, 2003); Bill Lewinski, Study Reveals Important
Truths Hidden in the Details of Officer-Involved Shootings (Force Science Institute,
August 10, 2005).

80

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October 22, 2014.

Ottawa Shooting: Michael Zehaf-Bibeau Made Video, Police Say. CBC

TV, October 26, 2014.
Ottawa Shooting: MPs, Eyewitnesses Describe Shootings: RAW: Ottawa
Shooting Witness Clips. CBC TV, October 22, 2014.
Ottawa Shooting: MPs Vow to Carry on after Gunman Storms Hill. CBC,
October 23, 2014.
Ottawa Shooting Puts Spotlight On Tighter Parliament Security.
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Ottawa Shooting: RCMP Takes over Investigation, OPP to Probe Police
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The Globe and Mail, March 6, 2015.
Ottawa Shooting: Reconstructing the Centre Block Shootout. CBC TV,
November 2, 2014.
Ottawa Shooting: Reporter Josh Wingrove Caught Dramatic Scene on
Video. The Globe and Mail, October 22, 2014.
Ottawa Shooting Suspect Michael Zehaf-Bibeau Had Very Developed
Criminality. CTV, October 23, 2014.
Parliament Hill Shooting: Killing Of Michael Zehaf Bibeau Was Justified,
Report Concludes. The Canadian Press, April 2, 2015.
Patrice Vincent, Nathan Cirillo Honoured at Iraq Mission. CBC News,
November 10, 2014.
Patriquin, Martin. Martin Couture-Rouleau: A Homegrown Madman.
Macleans, October 22, 2014.
Payton, Laura. Ottawa Shooting: Reporter Josh Wingrove Caught
Dramatic Scene on Video. CBC News, October 22, 2014.
Payton, Laura, and Kady OMalley. Ottawa Shooting: MPs Vow to Carry
on after Gunman Storms Hill. CBC News, October 23, 2014.
Pugliese, David. Parliament Hill Gunmans Knife Taken from Mount
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10

Born and raised in Canada, Graeme

MacQueen received his Ph.D. in Buddhist
Studies from Harvard University and taught
in the Religious Studies department of
McMaster University for 30 years. In 1989
he became founding Director of the Centre
for Peace Studies at McMaster, after which
he was involved in peace-building projects
in several war zones. His book The 2001
Anthrax Deception was published by
Clarity Press in 2014.

The events of October 22, 2014 were used by the Canadian

government to justify the passage of several bills, of which C-51 is
the most famous, that reduce the civil rights of Canadians while
expanding the powers of security services. Yet there has been no
serious investigation into the events of that day.
Security services killed the suspect so there will be no court case.
Police reports released in March, 2015 steer clear of the central
questions and are marred by poor methodology and unjustified
conclusions.
Journalists have declined to probe questions that beg for answers.
This Report sets out thirty-four unanswered questions and
concludes:
There should be a federal public inquiry into the violent events that
took place in Canada in October 2014. Although the Ottawa attacks
of October 22, 2014, should be at the centre of this inquiry,
investigation of surrounding events, including those of October 20 in
Quebec, should be included. If the federal government declines to
establish such an inquiry, provincial public inquiries, separate or
joint, should be established in the affected provinces.